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THE QUALITIES OF COMPLETENESS: 
MORE? OR LESS? 
Mark R. Killenbeck* 
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, 
SOURCES, & ORIGINS. Edited by Neil H. Cogan. New York: Ox­
ford University Press. 1997. Pp. Ix, 708. $95. 
On January 14, 1983, Chief Judge W. Brevard Hand announced 
what he knew would be widely regarded as a rather startling propo­
sition. Believing that "[t]he first amendment in large part was a 
guarantee to the states which insured that the states would be able 
to continue whatever church-state relationship existed in 1791,"1 
Judge Hand held that the people of Alabama were perfectly free to 
"establish[ ] a religion," in this instance by allowing public school 
teachers to begin the school day with prayer.2 The ruling reversed 
an earlier decision in the same case, which characterized the statu­
tory provision at issue as "state involvement respecting an estab­
lishment of religion" that was barred by "binding precedent which 
this Court is under a duty to follow[.]"3 On further reflection, how­
ever, Judge Hand concluded that the decisions commanding that 
result had, "in fact, amended the Constitution to the consternation 
of the republic. "4 That, Judge Hand believed, led ineluctably to a 
sense of "justice [that] is myopic, obtuse, and janus-like,"5 a juris­
prudential world he no longer wished to inhabit. 
Predictably, those enamored of the idea of formal prayer in 
public school classrooms praised the decision as "historic," a ruling 
that "breathes new life into the Constitution of these United 
States. "6 Those inclined to take seriously the Court's rulings, in 
* Wylie H. Davis Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. A.B. 1970, 
Boston College; J.D. 1987, Ph.D. 1987, University of Nebraska. - Ed. 
1. Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1115 (S.D. Ala. 1983) (emphasis 
added). 
2. See la/free, 554 F. Supp. at 1128. 
3. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 430 (1962)). 
4. la/free, 554 F. Supp. at 1128. 
5. Jaffree, 554 F. Supp. at 1129. 
6. Bill Prochnau, Judge Hands High Court a 'Reversal', WASH. Posr, Jan. 15, 1983, at Al 
(quoting Governor Fob James). This is, of course, the same Fob James whose runoff win in 
the Alabama gubernatorial primary was characterized as "a convincing victory for religious 
conservatives," Kevin Sack, Alabama Governor Wins Runoff in Triumph for the Right, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 1998, at A18, and whose eventual loss in the general election was "a stunning 
setback for the Christian right," Steven A. Holmes, The 1998 Elections: State By State -
1629 
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turn, characterized it as "an act of anarchy,"7 a direct assault on 
settled precedent declaring that "[t]he 'establishment of religion' 
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can set up a church."8 Indeed, Judge 
Hand himself admitted that his was "a voice crying in the wilder­
ness[, an] attempt to right that which the Court is persuaded is a 
misreading of history," and predicted that his decision would likely 
"come to nothing more than blowing in the hurricane[.]"9 On that 
score at least, he was certainly correct. The winds of reversal arose 
quickly and swept away his constitutional heresies. On February 
11, Justice Powell, sitting as Circuit Justice, entered an order staying 
the judgment, observing that there was "little doubt . . that con­
ducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional 
under this Court's decisions."10 Three months later, a panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed that portion of 
Judge Hand's ruling allowing for state establishment, stressing that 
"[t]he Supreme Court . .. has carefully considered [Judge Hand's] 
arguments and rejected them."11 And in June 1985, in a ruling fo­
cusing on the related question of whether the state could call for a 
moment of silence, the Court itself administered the coup de grace, 
stressing that "it [is] unnecessary to comment at length on the 
District Court's remarkable conclusion that the Federal Constitu­
tion imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state reli­
gion," and reminding one and all "how firmly embedded in our 
constitutional jurisprudence is the proposition that the several 
States have no greater power to restrain individual freedoms pro-
South; Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at BS. He is also the individual who threatened to 
call out the state police and National Guard to defend the right of a state judge to post the 
Ten Co=andments in his courtroom and co=ence jury selection with prayers, see Rick 
Bragg, Judge Allows God's Law to Mix With Alabama's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at A14, 
and promised to resist the federal district court decision enjoining enforcement of Alabama's 
most recent school prayer measure, see Chandler v. James, 998 F. Supp. 1255 (M.D. Ala. 
1997), "by every legal and political means, with every ounce of strength I possess," Kevin 
Sack, In South, Prayer Is a Form of Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at A9 (quoting 
Governor Fob James). And he is the same Fob James who apparently realizes that much of 
this is a charade. See Editorial, Bama's Governor Tells All, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at Al8 
(noting that in a moment of candor, when he did not know a microphone could catch his 
words, James informed the sponsor of a bill allowing a moment of silence in public schools 
that " You ain't going to require [expletive] until you get some relief from the U. S. Con­
gress . . . .  Y'all are just going through the motions, and I'm going along with you. That's the 
bad part of it."). 
7. Rod Griffith, Regional News: Alabama, U.P. 1., Jan. 15, 1983 (quoting Professor Benno 
Schmidt), available in LEXIS, News; Arcnws Library. 
8. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 {1947) (emphasis added). 
9. Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 ( S.D. Ala. 1983). 
10. Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 459 U.S. 1314, 1315 {Powell, Circuit Justice 1983). 
11. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1530 {11th Cir. 1983). 
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tected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the 
United States."12 
Judge Hand's opinion is, I suspect, not much read today. In­
deed, the Supreme Court's repudiation of his views is itself largely 
absent from the major texts used to instruct the next generation of 
lawyers, generally appearing, if at all, as a short extract used to il­
lustrate the nature and scope of what are now perceived to be more 
important decisions.13 And while the Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is itself in disarray, there is little doubt that formal 
prayers, organized by a state official and recited as a part of a 
mandatory public school exercise, are unconstitutional as matters 
stand today.14 Little doubt, that is, unless one is inclined to take 
liberties with the Court's holdings by going to elaborate lengths to 
ground the decision in notions that the particular prayers it seeks to 
sustain are "permi[ssive]," "passive," and "the result of student, not 
government choice."15 Or unless one takes seriously the originalist 
enterprise and realizes, as did Judge Hand, that many of the prac­
tices he was asked to condemn in Jaffree were routinely embraced 
by virtually every member of the founding generation who had oc­
casion to pass judgment on them. 16 
The issue, for purposes of this review, is not whether the Bill of 
Rights should somehow have been understood in 1791 to limit the 
power of the states to engage in or support a variety of religious 
12. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985). This was not the end of the litigation. 
Making good on an earlier threat to consider whether certain textbooks advancing the "reli· 
gion" of "secular humanism" should also be barred, see Jaffree, 554 F. Supp. at 1129 n.41, 
Judge Hand so found, and so enjoined, when the case returned to him on remand - he was 
again emphatically reversed. See Smith v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 655 F. Supp. 939 {S.D. 
Ala.), revd., 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). 
13. An unscientific survey of my own bookshelves reveals, for example, that Wallace is 
used as a major case in only one of the "major" Constitutional Law and Frrst Amendment 
casebooks, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHoPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES -
COMMENTS - QUESTIONS 620 (2d ed. 1996). It is quoted briefly twice in GERALD GUNTHER 
& KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1464, 1506 (13th ed. 1997), quoted, again, 
briefly, in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1573-74 (3d ed. 1996), is rele­
gated to footnote mention in WILLIAM W. VAN ALsTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 855 n.19 (2d ed. 1995), and has disappeared entirely from the pages of WILLIAM 
COHEN & JONATHAN VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed., 
1997). And, ironically, in the one avowedly "historical" casebook, Wallace is discussed 
briefly and the Rehnquist dissent simply characterized as "disput[ing] the majority's histori­
cal analysis." PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CoNSTITUTIONAL DECI· 
SIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1425 (2d ed. 1992). This is a shame, for Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent offers a splendid vehicle for confronting many of the issues posed by 
originalism. 
14. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 {1992). 
15. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993). 
16. I discuss these matters at greater length at infra text accompanying notes 164-201. 
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practices. 17 As Chief Justice Marshall would subsequently affirm, 
the clear understanding was that "[t]hese amendments demanded 
security against the apprehended encroachments of the general 
government - not against those of the local governments."18 
Rather, the question is how we are to understand the prohibition on 
the establishment of religion. For Judge Hand, "[a]nything short of 
the outright establishment of a national religion," even if under­
taken by Congress, would not violate the First Amendment. 19 
Congress, after all, concluded its first session with a joint resolution 
calling on the President to "recommend to the people of the United 
States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed, by 
acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the many and signal favors of 
Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peacea­
bly to establish a constitution of government for their safety and 
happiness."2 0 Why, then, were the people of Alabama forbidden to 
enact a measure calling for an announcement, at the beginning of 
the school day, of "a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in 
duration . . .  for meditation or voluntary prayer"?2 1 
Dean Neil Cogan's The Complete Bill of Rights22 is, by any rea­
sonable standard of measurement, a magnificent accomplishment. 
Cited by the Court while still in galleys, 2 3 The Complete Bill of 
Rights is likely to become the standard source book for those seek­
ing to ground their examination of the issues posed by the first ten 
amendments in the original source materials describing their draft­
ing, discussion, and ratification. Cogan's work is, by design, in­
tended to be more comprehensive and more definitive than 
previously available compilations. 2 4 There is, he informs us, "no 
satisfactory set of texts," no set that is "complete, accurate, and ac-
17. For his part, Judge Hand thought that in incorporating the Frrst Amendment against 
the states, the judiciary had illegitimately "amended the Constitution to the consternation of 
the republic." Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983). 
18. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (9 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). 
19. See la/free, 554 F. Supp. at 1115. 
20. 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 92 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
21. ALA. CODE§ 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984), quoted in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 
(1985). 
22. Neil Cogan is Dean of Quinnipiac College School of Law. 
23. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2180 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
24. These include, for example, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971); CREATING TIIB BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DocuMENTARY REc. 
ORD FROM TIIB FIRST FEDERAL CoNGRESS (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991); THE ESSENTIAL 
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL ARGUMENTS AND FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS (Gordon Lloyd 
& Margie Lloyd eds., 1998); and 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Phillip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). One might also consult both the standard source for state constitu­
tional materials, the seven volume THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND 0TIIBR ORGANIC LAws (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., Scholarly Press 1977) 
(1909) [hereinafter Thorpe], and various volumes in SouRCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTIONS (William F. Swindler ed., 2d series 1982). 
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cessible" (p. lvii). And by most reasonable standards, he succeeds 
admirably. An individual interested, for example, in examining the 
antecedents of a given amendment in the many state and colonial 
constitutions, charters, and laws finds each provision set forth se­
quentially, by amendment, rather than, as is the case in other 
works, scattered throughout several volumes and then provided 
only as a sometimes difficult-to-find part of a more extensive docu­
ment.25 This does not mean that the execution is perfect or that 
one is likely to find everything one might seek or believe to be im­
portant. As Cogan himself acknowledges, "there have been choices 
and difficulties," and the work itself is, accordingly, only "reason­
ably complete" (p. lviii). 
That is not, however, the only problem. For example, were the 
only possible quarrel one about the decision to limit discussions 
taken from treatises to those found in Blackstone's Commentaries 
there would be little to argue about.26 In these, as in so many other 
matters editorial, decisions reflect tastes and perspectives. There is, 
then, little to be gained by disputing individual choices, although, as 
I will make clear in Part I of this review, I have my reservations 
about some of the decisions Dean Cogan has made. My major con­
cerns, however, deal with much more fundamental matters. For as 
Cogan himself makes entirely clear, The Complete Bill of Rights is 
arguably the complete record only if one believes, as Dean Cogan 
apparently does, that what is needed are those "materials . . that 
are of significant use and value to originalists and the many non­
originalists who include originalist texts in their interpretations and 
other work" (pp. lvii-lviii). And even then, it is complete only if the 
version of originalism one accepts confines itself to the meanings 
anq inferences that may be gleaned from the words of a rather lim­
ited number of individuals and entities, speaking over a very limited 
period of time. 
There is nothing necessarily wrong with either of these proposi­
tions, although, as I will explain in Parts II and III of this review, I 
have substantial reservations about the originalist enterprise as it is 
commonly practiced and will illustrate those concerns by examining 
two issues of particular interest. The first, the nature of the rela­
tionship between the federal and state governments, is a matter of 
25. Compare, for example, Cogan's treatment of the state and colonial antecedents to the 
Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment (pp. 279-81 ), with the treatment in Thorpe, supra 
note 24. Someone wishing to read the provisions Cogan identifies in two pages would be 
required to search two of Thorpe's seven volumes, a happy coincidence made possible only 
because the constitutions and charters of four of the five states Cogan identifies fall in vol­
ume 5 of Thorpe, supra note 24. 
26. Although, for reasons I explain at infra text accompanying note 200, there might well 
be a very good argument for including within this volume extracts not just from the first 
English edition of Blackstone, but also from the first annotated American edition prepared 
by St. George Tucker. 
1634 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1629 
some concern given the language. and import of the Tenth 
Amendment. The second, in tum, while not "perhaps our oldest 
question of constitutional law"27 - a description aptly applied to 
the sovereignty concerns I address in Part II - is nevertheless a 
matter of extraordinary contemporary interest: the extent to which 
the Establishment Clause commands that there must be "a wall of 
separation between Church and State. "28 
In particular, I am concerned about any originalist inquiry that 
believes it appropriate to assume that a compilation that places an 
outer limit of September 2, 1790, on the materials it collects is, in 
any meaningful sense, "complete."29 And I suspect that the indi­
viduals who drafted, debated, and ratified the proposals that be­
came the Bill of Rights would agree. This does not mean that an 
argument cannot be made that Madison, for example, embraced 
what might be characterized as a form of originalism, although as 
Jack Rakove has demonstrated far more ably than I might, it is es­
sential that we recognize that Madison's views in these matters are 
nuanced and complex.30 Rather, I believe it important to recognize 
that even if we accept many of the assumptions that animate the 
originalist enterprise, a collection predicated on the choices Dean 
Cogan has made cannot, by its very nature, be "the most complete, 
accurate, and accessible set of texts available for interpreting the 
Bill of Rights" (p. Iv; capitalization removed). Indeed, one of the 
virtues and ironies of The Complete Bill of Rights is that it vindi­
cates Judge Hand, for one cannot find within its pages any of the 
materials required to sustain the proposition that the Framers and 
Founders in fact intended to deny to each state the power to "estab­
lish a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provide such 
limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular govern­
ment as its judgment dictated."31 
27. New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 149 (1992). 
28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and 
Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of 
Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802) [hereinafter Danbury Baptist Letter], in 15 THE WRmNGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 282 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905) [here· 
inafter JEFFERSON'S WRmNGs]. 
29. That is the date on which the new Pennsylvania Constitution was "formally pro· 
claimed," see 5 Thorpe, supra note 24, at 3092 n.a, and provisions from that Constitution 
mark the outer limits, chronologically, of the materials Cogan compiles. 
30. For an extended discussion of these matters, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEAN· 
INGs: PoLmcs AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION {1996). For a shorter 
treatment, see Jack N. Rakove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, in INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 179 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990). 
31. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
Barron, of course, stands for the proposition that the Bill of Rights was neither intended to 
be nor should be interpreted as binding upon the states, a ruling undermined by the subse­
quent ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court's adoption of the principle of 
selective incorporation. Arguably, Barron's demise makes the rejection of Judge Hand's ar­
guments a relatively simple matter. Nevertheless, while the Court as a whole shows no sign 
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This is, admittedly, a single example of what I believe to be a 
fundamental flaw in any vision of this work that views it as com­
plete. And that flaw does not, in itself, deny the volume its rightful 
place as an "invaluable resource for constitutional scholars, teach­
ers, litigators, and judges alike."32 It does, however, counsel that 
this book, and the interpretive view it seems to support, be ap­
proached cautiously and on its own terms. I will, accordingly, un­
dertake this review of The Complete Bill of Rights in stages, first 
examining its structure and claims on their own terms, and then 
exploring two of the reasons why I believe it important to consider 
carefully the nature and implications of originalism as a means of 
giving life and meaning to a document that, while a "paper barrier," 
nevertheless articulated a fundamental national commitment to the 
protection of what Madison himself characterized as "the great 
rights of mankind."33 
I. How COMPLETE Is "COMPLETE"? 
Dean Cogan concedes, presumably cheerfully, that his is, in 
both form and intention, an originalist enterprise. This undertaking 
is consistent with the spirit of his earlier work, which tends to be 
intensely historical.34 It is also an enterprise within which, as Dean 
Cogan notes, both interpretation and disagreement are inevitable 
(pp. lv-lvi), especially where, as is so often the case when it is the 
of retreating from incorporation, Justice Thomas may well have that doctrine in his "revision­
ist" sights. In Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334 (1995), for example, Justice 
Thomas's rather curious formulation of the scope of the FrrstAmendment, see Mcintyre, 514 
U.S. at 359 ("The Frrst Amendment states that the government 'shall make no law.'"), seems 
to have provoked a pointed footnote in the majority opinion stressing that "[a]lthough the 
text of the Frrst Amendment" speaks only of "'Congress . . •  Justice Brandeis' view [on incor­
poration] has been embedded in our law ever since," Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 336 n.1 (citations 
omitted). And there are any number of scholars who continue to insist that there is no con­
stitutional justification for incorporation, the most notable being the prolific originalist Raoul 
Berger. See, e.g., RAoUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). Judge Hand, by the way, cited Berger's work exten­
sively. See Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 554 F. Supp. 1104,,1106, 1119 n.26, 1120 n.27, 
1121 n.29, 1122, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983). 
32. Anthony G. Amsterdam, quoted on jacket. 
33. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 449 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison). 
This observation fell in Madison's opening remarks, explaining why he wished the House to 
indulge him and consider the people's "wishes, and expressly declare the great rights of man­
kind secured under this constitution." Cogan does not include this portion of the speech, or 
much of the debate it precipitated. That decision reflects, presumably, his judgment that this 
sort of context is not needed in a work that probes the drafts, debates, sources, and origins of 
specific provisions. I disagree, but opt not to pick that particular nit at any length. 
34. See, e.g., Neil H. Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Pa­
triae," 22 S.C. L. REv. 147 (1970); Neil Howard Cogan, Section 1985(3)'s Restructuring of 
Equality: An Essay on Texts, History, Progress, and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 515 
(1987). For a work less historical, but fascinating for its insights into the paradigms that 
ought to guide the allocation of authority between the federal and state governments, see 
Neil H. Cogan, The Rules of Everyday Life, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Ser. 97 
(1996). 
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Constitution about which we are concerned, the text "uses words 
that are not specific but invitingly - or irritatingly - open­
ended. "3 5 
The Complete Bill of Rights itself, Dean Cogan tells us, grows 
out of "The Need for a Set of Originalist Texts" (p. lvii), there be­
ing, for example, no single place "where one can read all the drafts 
of the provisions" and "no single source that provides all the perti­
nent constitutional and statutory sources for the Bill of Rights" (p. 
lvii). And while the volume strives to be complete, Cogan recog­
nizes that 
inevitably, even persons who agree that the task is simply to apply a 
provision engage in interpretation by their selection process, that is, 
by the dictionaries or treatises or cases they choose to read in order to 
learn the meaning of a provision, not to mention the personal exper­
iences they bring to the reading process. [p. lvi] 
These statements require careful examination. 
For example, Cogan tells us little about the individuals who will, 
presumably, find this work of value. He does, in a discussion aptly 
labeled "The Importance of Originalism, More or Less" (pp. lvi­
lvii), offer thumbnail sketches of the four main variations on the 
originalist theme, approaches that seek only, or in combination, the 
"meaning of the applicable provision," the "original intention" of 
those who drafted that provision, the "original understanding" of 
those who ratified the provision, or the "principles" for which that 
and related provisions might stand (p. lvi). Cogan does not identify 
individual originalists or illustrate the implications of their interpre­
tive regime with citations to or discussions of particular doctrines or 
cases. Of course, the failure to do so is arguably beside the point. 
The Complete Bill of Rights is not a treatise on originalism, or even 
a treatise on the Bill of Rights. It is, rather, an attempt to provide 
the "materials" that originalists need to practice their particular in­
terpretive art. Viewed in that light, his failure to assuage any con­
cerns the reader might have about the nature and practice of 
originalism are, at best, quibbles.3 6 
More telling, I believe, are the qualifiers Cogan injects into his 
various descriptions of the scope of the collected materials. The 
Complete Bill of Rights will provide originalists, he tells us, with the 
"pertinent constitutional and statutory sources" and those materials 
that are of "significant use and value" (p. lvii). Cogan's use of the 
qualifiers "pertinent" and "significant" is, well, pertinent and signif-
35. Neil H. Cogan, Moses and Modernism, 92 M1CH. L. REv. 1347, 1352 {1994) {footnote 
omitted). 
36. This does not mean that the work would not have benefitted from a slightly more 
elaborate discussion, suitably supported by references to the primary practitioners and exam­
ples of the sorts of decisions in which the materials Cogan collects might prove especially 
relevant. 
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icant. Consider, for example, the question of "pertinent sources." 
Dean Cogan indicates that he 
sought out materials that would have been available to the members 
of the First Congress or with which they would have been familiar. 
With just a few exceptions, these consist of collections of constitu­
tions, statutes, laws, and charters published before 1789 and available 
in libraries in New York and other important cities. In addition, these 
materials include such widely known and widely held texts as the ba­
sic English constitutional materials, Blackstone's Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, and American and English caselaw. [p. lviii] 
These are reasonable limitations. Cogan's decision to confine trea­
tise citations to Blackstone, for example, might simply reflect a per­
sonal predilection, but more likely acknowledges the fact that the 
Commentaries were the most widely available and, in many re­
spects, most influential legal resource in the various colonies and 
states prior to ratification. Be that as it may, many of the choices he 
has made are nevertheless curious and worthy of examination. 
In the section of the work dealing with the search and seizure 
provisions of the Fourth Amendment, for example, Dean Cogan of­
fers nine "pertinent" secondary sources: Blackstone's discussion of 
arrest, and eight cases, seven from England and one, the Writs of 
Assistance controversy, from Massachusetts (pp. 242-63). Many of 
these are indeed "standard" sources. The Court has stressed, for 
example, that "[t]he writs of assistance . .. were the principle griev­
ance against which the fourth amendment was directed,"37 and has 
described Entick v. Carrington (p. 257) as "a 'monument of English 
freedom' 'undoubtedly familiar' to 'every American statesman' at 
the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be 'the 
true and ultimate expression of constitutional law."'38 Even The 
King v. Dr. Purnell, 39 cited only infrequently by the Court itself, 
might nevertheless properly be described as one of the "'common 
law and British institutions' " that factored into the general under­
standing '"when the instrument was framed and adopted."'40 
Absent from these pages, however, are many other primary 
source materials that have substantially influenced the Court's in­
terpretation of core Fourth Amendment issues. Recently, for ex­
ample, the Court considered both whether the common law 
"'knock and announce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness 
37. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1988) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886); THOMAS M. CoOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS *301-02). 
38. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626). 
39. 95 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1748). This case is included at p. 245. 
40. FISher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 418 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quot­
ing Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925) and citing Purnell, 95 Eng. Rep. at 597). 
But see Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385-86 (1911) (noting that Purnell had been 
called to the attention of the Court but deeming it not controlling). 
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inquiry under the Fourth Amendment"41 and what, if any, excep­
tions to knock and announce might be constitutionally permiss­
ible. 42 Writing for a unanimous Court in the first of these cases, 
Justice Thomas undertook a decidedly originalist analysis, premised 
on the assumption that the Court should ground its understanding 
in "the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing. "43 
As part of that process, Justice Thomas traced both the common 
law origins of the knock and announce requirement and the various 
constitutional, statutory, and common law treatments of this issue 
in England and the United States prior to ratification. 
It is hardly surprising that Justice Thomas begins this analysis 
with Blackstone, and that the particular doctrine he cites, that "the 
common law generally protected a man's house as 'his castle of de­
fence and asylum,' "44 is found in The Complete Bill of Rights (pp. 
242-43). And given Cogan's decision to limit citations from trea­
tises to Blackstone, and his apology for excluding Hale (p. lix), it is 
arguably appropriate that The Complete Bill of Rights does not in­
clude materials from either that individual or from William 
Hawkins, authorities whose eighteenth century treatments of the 
knock and announce doctrine Justice Thomas found especially valu­
able.45 What is surprising, at least to me, is that Cogan chooses not 
to provide the extracts from any of the major English and colonial 
cases articulating the knock and announce exception, especially in 
the light of the fact that one, Semayne's Case, offers an extended 
discussion of the English common law understanding of the King's 
power to "break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do 
other execution of the K.'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter."46 
Is this an unfair criticism? It is, after all, far easier to identify 
what is missing, as opposed to undertaking the onerous task of as­
certaining and finding everything necessary to make a work com-
41. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). 
42. See United States v. Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. 992, 995 (1998) (holding that the lawfulness 
of a "no knock" entry does not depend on whether property is broken during the course of 
the entry); Richards v. W1Sconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997) (rejecting a blanket exception 
to the knock and announce requirement for drug investigations in favor of a requirement 
that there be a "reasonable suspicion" that knock and announce would prove dangerous or 
render the search futile). 
43. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931 (citations omitted). 
44. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288). 
45. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 932 (quoting 1 MATIHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS oF 
THE CROWN *582 and 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 138 
(6th ed. 1788)). 
46. 77 Eng. Rep. 94, 95 (K.B. 1603). Perhaps this omission reflects the case's age, 
although Dean Cogan does cite some cases from the 17th century, notably Sir John Knight's 
Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B. 1686) (p. 204), Titus Oates' Case, 10 Howell's State Trials 1079 
(K.B. 1685) (Eng.) (p. 624), and the Earl of Shaftesbury's Case and Trial, 8 Howell's State 
Trials 759 (1681) (Eng.) (pp. 293 & 489). 
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plete. The principal case in the recent knock and announce trilogy, 
Wilson, is nevertheless a fairly significant decision of the Court, 
given the intensity with which law enforcement agencies have pur­
sued exceptions to knock and announce as part of the "war" on 
drugs.47 And the absence from the pages of The Complete Bill of 
Rights of the materials central to that opinion is, I suspect, an omis­
sion of some consequence. 
The same can be said of Dean Cogan's failure to draw on a sec­
ond body of materials that he himself intimates are of considerable 
interest: dictionaries. More than once, Cogan tells us that contem­
porary dictionaries· are an appropriate means for ascertaining what 
the Framers meant when they crafted the Bill of Rights. His discus­
sion of the quest for "the original meaning of the applicable provi­
sion," for example, notes that "[t]his might require learning the 
meaning of words from contemporaneous dictionaries" (p. lvi). 
And, as I have already noted, he recognizes that the interpreter's 
choice of the "dictionaries ... they chose to read in order to learn 
the meaning of a provision" is of some consequence (p. lvi). Never­
theless, he chooses not to include any dictionary citations in his 
collection. 
This is surprising, given the extent to which recourse to the lexi­
cographer's art has factored in many of the Court's more intriguing 
"originalist" discussions.48 This is especially the case when one con­
siders the Eighth Amendment, a provision for which the Court's 
occasional focus on "evolving standards of human decency" stands 
in stark contrast to its avowal, in numerous other contexts, of the 
need for close attention to what the Framers and Founders had in 
mind.49 
47. It is worth noting that there was no resort to co=on law materials in either Richards 
or Ramirez, even though the latter turned on whether the federal statute authorizing an of­
ficer to break into a dwelling while executing a warrant, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1994), "codifies 
the exceptions to the co=on-law announce requirement." Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. at 997. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who expresses an occasional devotion to a jurisprudence of original 
intent, nevertheless declined the opportunity to engage in that practice here, writing simply 
for a unanimous Court "that § 3109 includes an exigent circumstances exception and that the 
exception's applicability in a given instance is measured by the same standard we articulated 
in Richards." Id. at 998. Richards, in tum, another unanimous opinion, this time by Justice 
Stevens, is equally devoid of originalist analysis. See Richards, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
48. For an interesting discussion of the issues posed by resort to dictionaries, and its 
abuses, see Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998). 
49. One can, for example, compare Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994) (not­
ing that "gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another" cannot be 
squared "with 'evolving standards of decency"' (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 
(1976)), with the Court's narrower view in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611-18 (1993) 
(grounding its view of forfeiture and the Excessive Fmes Clause in the understanding of the 
Framers), and especially with the opinion that earned Justice Thomas the sobriquet "The 
Youngest, Cruelest Justice," see N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A24, his dissent in Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 17 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (grounding his objection to the 
expansion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in a historical context). 
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For example, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 50 both Justice Blackmun, speaking for the 
Court, and Justice O'Connor, in dissent, devote considerable time 
and energy to an exploration of what the Framers of the Bill of 
Rights had in mind when they included the Excessive Fines Clause 
in the Eighth Amendment.51 As part of that process, each found it 
necessary and appropriate to consult contemporary law dictionaries 
to determine what meaning individuals at the time might have 
ascribed to the word "fine," and whether that term might have in­
cluded civil damages within its ambit.5Z In Farmer v. Brennan, 
Justice Thomas resorted to dictionaries, contemporaneous and 
modem, to bolster his argument that "[c]onditions of confinement 
are not punishment in any recognized sense of the term, unless im­
posed as part of a sentence."53 And in its recent decision finding 
that a forfeiture levied for attempting to leave the country with 
over ten thousand dollars of currency was "grossly disproportion­
ate," the Court found it appropriate to consult Dr. Johnson in an 
attempt to discern what the Framers might have understood the 
word "excessive" to mean.54 
The astute reader will recall Cogan's concession that choices 
needed to be made, and one might well believe that the decisions 
Cogan made are entirely reasonable. There are, I suspect, any 
number of English and colonial cases that might usefully be cited 
on the general question of search and seizure. Is it possible to in­
clude them all, or even simply every one that various critics might 
find meaningful ? And, once one begins the process of offering dic­
tionary definitions, where does one stop ? Indeed, why might one 
begin at all given the availability of an alternative work, which, 
while not itself offering dictionary definitions, strives to provide "an 
alphabetical index to contemporaneous and antecedent sources ex-
50. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
51. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264-76; 492 U.S. at 286-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). The issue in Browning-Ferris was whether the Excessive Fines 
Clause applied to punitive damages awards in civil cases, a question the Court examined in 
the light of "the purposes and concerns of the Amendment, as illuminated by its history." 
492 U.S. at 264. The Court held that it did not. 
52. See 492 U.S. at 265 n.6 (quoting the definition of "fines for offences" from 2 T. CUN· 
NINGHAM, A NEw AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (1765)); 492 U.S. at 265 n.7 (indicating 
that "[p]etitioners have come forward with no evidence, or argument, which convinces us 
that the word 'fine,' as used in the late 18th century, would have encompassed private civil 
damages of any kind"); see also 492 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent­
ing in part) (discussing Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1677), and quoting 
the definition of "fine" from a contemporaneous source, T. BLOUNT, LAW DICTlONARY 
(1670)). 
53. 511 U.S.825, 859 (1994) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DicnONARY 1234 (6th ed.1990) and 
2 T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)). 
54. See United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2037 (1998) (citing 1 SAMUEL 
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 680 (4th ed. 1773)). 
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panded to such an extent that a lexicographer could use them to 
create a dictionary, without going further afield"?55 The answer to 
the first of these questions, of course, is that some omissions are 
potentially significant, especially where, as is the case with the 
knock and announce materials, those cases have factored into sig­
nificant, recent originalist decisions. The response to the second is 
that the Court does in fact resort to contemporaneous dictionaries 
in its attempt to discern what the Framers and Founders meant by a 
given word, or might have understood it to mean. And that while 
the number of words the Bill of Rights uses is substantial, those 
whose meaning has proven critical, and obscure, consists of a finite 
universe that Cogan tells us is of some consequence and might eas­
ily have been compiled. 
The gaps I identify are not, in any meaningful sense, a criticism 
of the enterprise itself. Individuals seeking the deeper, originalist 
meanings of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments will find consider­
able grist for their analytic mills in the materials Cogan collects. 
They will not, however, find all that might prove valuable, espe­
cially if, as is so often the case, their ultimate objective is to con­
vince the Court that their views are the correct ones. They will, 
obviously, have the benefit of a research tool that is clear, well­
executed, and user friendly. What they will not have, however, is a 
text that is complete in a truly meaningful sense, and that, I believe, 
is a point worth making. 
It is not, however, the most important objection that might be 
raised, for the real issue posed by The Complete Bill of Rights is the 
extent to which one is inclined to accept originalism as an appropri­
ate means for giving meaning to a constitution, a text that does not 
"partake of the prolixity of a legal code," but by its very nature 
"requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its impor­
tant objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose 
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects them­
selves. "56 Chief Justice Marshall's cautionary note is not, in and of 
itself, a rejection of the originalist enterprise. Indeed, Marshall 
himself observed that "the great duty of a judge who construes an 
instrument, is to find the intention of its makers."57 Nevertheless, 
Marshall himself did not confine his version of an originalist inquiry 
to that practiced by Dean Cogan.58 Nor, for that matter, did James 
55. THURSTON GREENE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CoNSTITUTION: A SOURCEBOOK AND 
GUIDE TO THE IDEAS, TERMS, AND VOCABULARY USED BY THE FRAMERS OF THE UNTIED 
STATES CONSTITUTION xv (1991). 
56. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
57. John Marshall, 3 A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 2, 1819, 
reprinted in JoHN MARsHALL's DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND 167, 168-69 (Gerald 
Gunther ed., 1969). 
58. See infra text accompanying notes 128-32. 
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Madison, arguably the author of the Bill of Rights and certainly, 
given the resolve with which he pursued that enterprise, the Framer 
most responsible for its existence. 5 9  Both understood and appreci­
ated the extent to which the Constitution's meaning, while 
grounded in the "language" of the instrument, 6 0  nevertheless re­
quired the interpreter to consider carefully words and events far 
beyond the limited framework proposed by Cogan and, in particu­
lar, by many of the members of the Court who undertake an 
originalist inquiry. It is to that aspect of Cogan's work that I now 
tum. 
II. AN 0RIGINALIST APPROACH TO COMPLETEN E S S  
Dean Neil Cogan did not give us originalism. Arguably, Edwin 
Meese and Robert Bork did, at least in the sense that they are per­
haps most responsible for propelling originalism to the forefront, 
rekindling a debate about a particular approach to constitutional 
interpretation that is as old as the document itself. 
The touchstones in the modem embrace of originalism as a cen­
tral tenet of an arguably "conservative" approach to matters consti­
tutional are familiar ones. There are, for example, Mr. Bork's 
various sallies, in which he maintains that it is necessary to "inter­
pret the document's words according to the intentions of those who 
drafted, proposed, and ratified its provisions and its various amend­
ments."6 1 There are the various speeches and articles by Mr. 
Meese, in which he argues for "a jurisprudence that seeks to be 
faithful to our Constitution - a jurisprudence of original inten­
tion[.]"6 2 There are the many, often eloquent pleas for a jurispru­
dence of original intent lodged by Professor Raoul Berger, whose 
adherence to this approach is premised on the "common sense" 
notion that "who better than the writer knows what the writer 
means - certainly not the reader."6 3 And there is the rich litera­
ture that these and similar paeans have spawned, an active and 
longstanding scholarly debate that shows no signs of slackening. 6 4  
59. For an interesting discussion of Madison's role, see Paul Fmkelman, James Madison 
and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 301. 
60. See, e.g., M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. 
61. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN 
DIEGO L. REv. 823, 826 (1986). 
62. Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 22, 26 (1985). 
63. Raoul Berger, The "Original Intent" - As Perceived by Michael McConnell, 91 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 242, 243 (1996). 
64. The literature is too extensive to list. Individuals seeking an initial understanding 
might profitably consult Jack Rakove's splendid compilation of many of the standard treat· 
ments, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. 
Rakove ed., 1990). For an extended historical treatment, see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988). A short "primer," in turn, is provided by 
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These devotees do not, as Dean Cogan notes, offer a single or 
even a dominant mode of analysis. One might, for example, profit­
ably compare the approaches adopted by Professor Berger and Mr. 
Meese. Berger, for example, insists that the only proper way to "se­
cure the cherished 'rights of Englishmen'" is to "adher[ e] to the 
words in which they were enshrined[.]"65 Mr. Meese's approach is, 
however, arguably softer: "Where the language of the Constitution 
is specific," he tells us, "it must be obeyed."66 And where there is 
"a demonstrable consensus among the Framers and ratifiers as to a 
principle stated or implied by the Constitution, it should be fol­
lowed."67 But "where there is ambiguity as to the precise meaning 
or reach of a constitutional provision," he concedes, "it should be 
interpreted and applied in a manner so as to at least not contradict 
the text of the Constitution itself."68 
Various members of the Court have embraced albeit with vary­
ing degrees of consistency, an originalist approach in their work. In 
some, but by no means in all, of the cases where the opportunity for 
originalist inquiry has been presented, 69 these Justices have argued 
that the interpretive process is, in effect, a relatively simple matter 
of returning to "first principles" that "every schoolchild learns."70 
One recent, and notable, instance is found in a series of decisions 
articulating the "new federalism," a doctrine that might be loosely 
described as the principle that state sovereignty is entitled to con­
siderably more respect than heretofore afforded.71 In the various 
decisions articulating this premise, Justices practicing the art and 
science of originalism examined the implications of the Tenth 
Amendment and characterized the interpretive process as a 
Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 1085 
{1989). 
65. Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove's Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 622 
{1997) (citing RAKoVE, supra note 30, at 290-92). 
66. Meese, supra note 62, at 26. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. In United States v. Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. 992 (1998), for example, one might profitably 
have inquired how the Framers and Founders viewed destruction of property as an element 
of entry to enforce a warrant, especially given the language found in Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. 
Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603), the English case central to Justice Thomas's analysis of the knock and 
announce rule in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). See supra text accompanying 
notes 41-46. 
70. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) ("As every schoolchild learns, our 
Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal 
Government."); see also United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Because the majority fundamentally misunderstands the 
notion of 'reserved' powers, I start with some first principles."); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("We start with first principles."). 
71. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452 (1991). 
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straightforward exercise in identifying the "federal balance the 
Framers designed ... that this Court is obliged to enforce."7 2 And 
they insisted that the conclusions they reached were driven, not by 
ideological perspectives or individual preferences, but rather by the 
need for steadfast adherence to "truths ... so basic that, like the air 
around us, they are easily overlooked."7 3 
Closer to home, when exploring issues posed by provisions more 
commonly associated with the protection of individual rights than is 
the Tenth Amendment, many of these same Justices argued for an 
interpretive regime in which the analytic touchstone is the "original 
meaning, for 'the Constitution is a written instrument. As such its 
meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted, it 
means now.' "7 4 That approach might, as it did for Justice Thomas 
in Mcintyre, mean that "the Framers understood the First 
Amendment to protect an author's right to express his thoughts on 
political candidates in an anonymous fashion."75 Or, given that the 
First Amendment does not in fact state that "the government 'shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press,' "7 6 but rather speaks of "Congress,'' it might mean that what 
really matters, as Justice Scalia noted in that same decision, is "fur­
ther evidence of common practice in 1868, since I doubt that the 
Fourteenth Amendment time-warped the post-Civil War States 
back to the Revolution.'' 7 7  In each instance, the task is to give ef­
fect to "the Court's (and the society's) traditional view that the 
Constitution bears its original meaning and is unchanging."7 8 
The members of the Court who embrace this approach stress 
that it is imposed on them by the Framers and Founders them­
selves. In Mcintyre, for example, Justice Scalia reminds us that 
Thomas Jefferson admonished that 
[o]n every question of construction, [we should] carry ourselves back 
to the time when the Constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit 
manifested in the debates; and instead of trying [to find] what mean-
72. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. at 157 (declaring that the Court's task "consists not of devising our preferred 
system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework set forth in the 
Constitution"). 
73. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 187. Assuming for the sake of argument that 
the methodology is appropriate, there are nevertheless numerous reasons to question the 
conclusions reached. Such matters are, alas, far beyond the proper scope of this review. 
74. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)). 
75. Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 371. 
76. Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 359 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
77. Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 375 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
78. Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 371-72. 
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ing may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to 
the probable one in which it was passed.79 
And Justice Thomas notes that the Court itself has long recognized 
this approach, stressing that iii 1838 Justice Baldwin maintained 
that "the meaning of the Constitution 'must necessarily depend on 
the words of the constitution [and] the meaning and intention of the 
convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratifica­
tion to the conventions . . .  in the several states.' "80 
This is all well and good. There is, for example, little doubt that 
Chief Justice Marshall espoused what might be characterized as a 
form of originalism when he observed that 
the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people 
who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their 
natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the 
imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubt re­
specting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that 
the objects for which it was given, especially when these objects are 
expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the 
construction. 81 
But it is equally clear that Marshall did not believe the interpretive 
inquiry should be confined to the words and actions of, for exam­
ple, the period between the convening of the Constitutional Con­
vention in May 1787 and the formal notice of ratification on July 2, 
1788, when Congress noted that New Hampshire had become the 
ninth state to ratify, satisfying the express terms of Article VIl.82 
Or that Madison, for example, would have found it appropriate to 
cut off an inquiry into the meaning of the Bill of Rights, as The 
Complete Bill of Rights would have us do, with the ratification of a 
new Constitution by the State of Pennsylvania in September 1790. 
Indeed, virtually every member of the Founding generation 
whose thoughts and words figure most prominently in original in­
tent jurisprudence understood that the Constitution they created 
sketched necessarily imprecise and frankly tentative parameters for 
a people and a nation that were embarking on a radical new course. 
For these individuals, ratification marked the first stages in a "great 
experiment,"83 the creation of a new, Compound Republic whose 
79. 514 U.S. at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 15 JEFFERSON'S WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 439, 449). 
80. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur­
ring) (quoting Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838)). 
81. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188-89 (1824). 
82. See Resolution of Congress, Dated July 2, 1788, Submitting Ratifications of the 
Constitution to a Committee, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF 
THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 1060 (Charles C. Tansil! ed., 1927). 
83. The allusion is taken from Jefferson, who spoke of complex and evolving questions to 
be "pursue[d) with temper and perseverance" as we continuously struggle to perfect "the 
great experiment which shall prove that man is capable of living in society, governing itself by 
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operational parameters would be ascertained only over time. This 
was especially the case when these individuals undertook the im­
portant yet delicate task of interpretation, for "[a]ll new laws, 
though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the 
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less 
obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascer­
tained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications."84 
"[N]o language," Madison reminds us, "is so copious as to supply 
words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to 
include many equivocally denoting different ideas."85 
This does not mean that an originalist cannot reach an appropri­
ate conclusion regarding the precise meaning of a given provision. 
As indicated, an originalist concerned with the meaning of the vari­
ous clauses of the Eighth Amendment might properly, and profita­
bly, consult a variety of sources for the dictionary meaning of such 
terms as "punishment," "fines," and "excessive."86 And someone 
might explore at length, as Justice Souter did in his dissent in 
Printz, the meanings and implications of a particular Federalist 
Paper in the quest for an understanding of what Hamilton had in 
mind when he declared that the national government could "em­
ploy the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its 
laws."87 
Too often, however, individuals undertaking this sort of inquiry 
assume that the only materials that might properly be consulted are 
words written and spoken within a very short time span. As I have 
already noted, The Complete Bill of Rights proceeds on this as­
sumption. Taken at face value, it postulates that the period that 
matters falls between the introduction of the measures that would 
Jaws self-imposed, and securing to its' members the enjoyment of life, liberty, property and 
peace." Thomas Jefferson, The solemn Declaration and Protest of the commonwealth of Vir­
ginia on the principles of the constitution of the US. of America and the violations of them 
(enclosure in Dec. 24, 1825 letter to James Madison), in 3 THE REPUBLIC OF LETIERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 1944, 
1946 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995). For other uses of this metaphor, see Letter from James 
Madison to John Adams (May 22, 1817), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 390, 391 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908) [hereinafter MADisoN's WRITINGS] (the "proper division and dis­
tribution of power among different bodies" is a "great question" and "experiment"), and 
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 A COMPILATION OF TiiE 
MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF TiiE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 213, 216 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1896) ("It is well worth a fair and fuJJ experiment."). 
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison). It is in this particular sense that 
M'Cul/och looms especially large; see infra text accompanying notes 128-32. 
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison). 
86. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in Printz v. United States, 
117 S. Ct. 2365, 2402 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting). For both a discussion of the general 
views on the authority of The Federalist, and a sense of how frequently the Court has resorted 
to this document, see Buckner F. Melton, Jr., The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A 
Citation List and Analysis, 1789-1996, 85 KY. L.J. 243 (1996-97). 
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become the Bill of Rights and the ratification of the ten amend­
ments that would eventually form the Bill itself. With the appropri­
ate exception of certain source materials (themselves, as I have 
indicated, arguably incomplete), Dean Cogan concentrates his col­
lection efforts on "drafts, debates, and sources" from the date of 
Madison's initial proposals, June 8, 1789, through the final stages of 
the ratification process. 
Many of the Justices pursing the originalist approach embrace 
an equally constricted frame of reference. In his Term Limits dis­
sent, for example, Justice Thomas concentrates virtually all of his 
time and energy on an explication of materials surrounding the 
framing and ratification. 88 As part of that analytic process, he 
places considerable store in the fact that at the time the 
Qualifications Clauses were ratified, several states had in force 
either constitutional or statutory provisions that imposed "qualifi­
cations" on members of Congress.89 And he goes on to damn 
Justice Story with faint praise, observing that while he "was a bril­
liant and accomplished man, and one cannot casually dismiss his 
views[] . . .  he was not a member of the Founding generation, and his 
Commentaries on the Constitution were written a half century after 
the framing. "9° 
There is, of course, nothing wrong with stressing that the 
Framers and Founders acted in ways that cast doubt on the legiti­
macy of a particular interpretation of the Constitution rendered 
some two hundred years later. Of course, as Justice Stevens 
stressed for the majority in the Term Limits case, virtually all of the 
state-imposed "qualifications" were quickly abandoned in the wake 
of ratification.91 And while it is true that Justice Story was himself 
not a Framer or Founder, he lived, worked, and presumably 
conversed with many of the most important members of that gener­
ation. His views on what these individuals might have had in mind 
are, I suspect, worthy of greater respect than Justice Thomas seems 
to accord them, especially when these same individuals themselves 
spoke of a text that was both imprecise and to be used in circum­
stances never before experienced.92 
What I question then is whether this sort of interpretive ap­
proach offers complete answers. In particular, I question the extent 
to which it comports with the understanding of many, albeit per-
88. See United States Tenn Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 867-916 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
89. See 514 U.S. at 901-03. 
90. 514 U.S. at 856. 
91. 514 U.S. at 823-25. 
92. Certainly Justice Story's views are worthy of as much respect as those of someone 
looking back over the centuries in an attempt to probe the minds of individuals Story himself 
knew firsthand. 
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haps not most, of the individuals who participated in the creation of 
both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
Consider, for example, an issue of extraordinary importance to 
those concerned about the meaning and effect of the Tenth 
Amendment: the nature and scope of the power of Congress to 
regulate commerce. As Justice Thomas has reminded us, the mod­
em "aggregation" doctrine characterized by decisions like Wickard 
v. Filburn,93 "is clever, but has no stopping point."94 More tellingly, 
if the commerce power includes within its ambit the authority to 
regulate matters understood at ratification to "belong" to the states 
- much less the power to regulate the affairs of the states them­
selves - there is something to be said for his desire to "be true to a 
Constitution that does not cede a police power to the Federal 
Govemment[.]"95 There is, nevertheless, a great deal to be said for 
the Court's current views on matters commercial, and its implica­
tions for the Tenth Amendment - especially if we focus, as I sus­
pect we must, not simply on what was said when the Commerce 
Clause was crafted and Tenth Amendment ratified, but on how the 
members of the Founding generation implemented that power and 
understood its limitations.96 
The federal power to regulate commerce was, by design, "com­
plete"97 and, of necessity, supreme.98 It was also, as virtually every­
one at the time understood, a textual grant of authority that was 
imprecise in its expression and about to be invoked in radically al­
tered circumstances. James Wilson, addressing concerns raised in 
the Pennsylvania Convention about the scope of the powers 
granted, observed: 
They have asserted that these powers are unlimited and undefined. 
These words are as easily pronounced as limited and defined . . . . [I]t is 
not pretended that the line is drawn with mathematical precision; the 
93. 317 U.S. 111 {1942). 
94. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
95. 514 U.S. at 602. 
96. In Justice Thomas's defense, I must note that his Lopez concurrence is one isolated 
example where an originalist takes what might be fairly characterized as the sort of "longitu­
dinal view" I espouse. 
97. Charles Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal 
Convention (May 28, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
106, 116 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) ("The 7th article invests the United States, with the com­
plete power of regulating the trade of the Union, and levying such imposts and duties . . .  as 
shall, in the opinion of Congress, be necessary and expedient."). Pinckney's characterization 
is especially interesting, since it pairs the positive power to regulate with the collateral power 
"to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper." 
98. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 7, 1785), in 8 THE PA­
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 333, 333 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973) 
[hereinafter MADisoN's PAPERS] (stating that the states "can no more exercise this power 
separately, than they could separately carry on war, or separately form treaties of alliance or 
Commerce"). 
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inaccuracy of language must, to a certain degree, prevent the accom­
plishment of such a desire. Whoever views the matter in a true light, 
will see that the powers are as minutely enumerated and defined as 
was possible[.]99 
This meant, as Madison in particular subsequently emphasized, that 
those seeking an understanding of how that power might properly 
be exercised could not simply rely on the words and understandings 
during debate and ratification. 
Madison stressed that " [i]t ought to have occurred that the 
Govt. of the U.S. being a novelty & a compound, had no technical 
terms or phrases appropriate to it, and that old terms were to be 
used in new senses, explained by the context or by the facts of the 
case."100 As a practical matter, it was incumbent on Congress to 
begin the process of assigning "new senses" to such "old terms" as 
the regulation of commerce, by enacting measures that transformed 
constitutional theory into republican reality. Thus, early in the first 
session, he wrote that "[a]mong other difficulties, the exposition of 
the Constitution is frequently a copious source, and must continue 
so until its meaning on all great points shall have been settled by 
precedents."101 Thus, for example, the first Congress enacted nu­
merous measures that did not regulate mere "selling, buying, and 
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes,"102 but were 
rather considered constitutionally proper exercises of the enumer­
ated power because Congress seemed to believe that the objects of 
regulation had what is now referred to as a " 'substantial effect' on 
[interstate] commerce."103 One of these was An Act for the govern­
ment and regulation of Seamen in the merchants service, 104 which, 
among other things, regulated numerous aspects of the day-to-day 
99. James Wiison, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), re­
printed in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 400, 401; see also Letter from 
George Washington, President of the Convention, to the President of Congress (Sept. 17, 
1787), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 305, 
305 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) {"It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line 
between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved[.]"). 
100. Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec., 1831), in 9 MADISON'S WRITINGS, 
supra note 83, at 471, 475. For an insightful discussion of this problem, see Lawrence Lessig, 
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395 (1995). 
101. Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 12  MADISON'S 
PAPERS, supra note 98, at 250; see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1912 (1791) (statement of Rep. 
Theodore Sedgwick) ("[T]he Constitution had expressly declared the ends of Legislation; but 
in almost every instance had left the means to the honest and sober discretion of the Legisla­
ture."). For a discussion of how Congress handled these issues, and the significance of what it 
accomplished, see DAVID P. CuRRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CoNGRESs: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD 1789-1801 (1997), and Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpre­
tation in the First Year of Congress, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 79 (1993). 
102. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
103. 514 U.S. at 584. 
104. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131. 
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working lives of ordinary seamen.105 "Seamen or mariners" were 
obviously necessary participants in a continuum that would lead ul­
timately to an exchange of goods. However, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to envision how Congress could require "an agreement 
in writing or in print, with every seaman or mariner on board" a 
ship "bound from a port in one state to a port in any other than an 
adjoining state,"106 unless Congress believed the Commerce Clause 
authorized something more than simple regulation of "selling, buy­
ing, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes."1°7 
Indeed, two arguably essential elements of the Act pose fundamen­
tal concerns about the extent to which the First Congress shared 
Justice Thomas's concerns about the sanctity of state sovereignty. 
The first made penalties paid by delinquent seamen to ship owners 
"recoverable in any court, or before any justice or justices of any 
state, city, town or county within the Umted States" that had "cog­
nizance of debts of equal value[.]"108 The second "required" local 
justices of the peace to resolve controversies between owners and 
seamen over the seaworthiness of a vessel.109 
105. The Act regulates, inter alia, the penalty for a seaman neglecting to render himself 
on board at the agreed-upon time; the procedures a shipmastcr must follow if his boat is 
leaky; and penalties for desertion. See Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §§ 2, 3, 5, 1 Stat. 131. 
While not quite "federal regulation of the janitor of a State building," RAouL BERGER, FED· 
ERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 130 (1987), the measure is nevertheless far broader than 
any Mr. Berger or Justice Thomas would presumably tolerate if we take seriously the implica­
tions of their writings. The structuring of and strictures imposed upon the relationship be­
tween employer and employee, for example, represent precisely the sorts of regulations a 
Court intent on enforcing a narrow view of the proper scope of the term "commerce" would 
condemn. Indeed, the Court, speaking in ways that echo the approach taken by Justice 
Thomas, did exactly that in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179 (1908) (holding that 
because "interstate commerce" does not cover labor organizations, Congress had no power 
to prohibit the discharge of employees based on union membership), and Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (holding that a pension plan 
is not a "regulation of the activity of interstate transportation"). These arc, presumably, 
some of the decisions Justice Thomas had in mind when he condemned "the Court's dramatic 
departure in the 1930's from a century and a half of precedent." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 599 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
106. § 1, 1 Stat. at 131. The stricture applied only to a "ship or vessel of the burthcn of 
fifty tons or upwards," § 1, much like modem requirements that trigger regulation only when 
an enterprise employs a specified minimum number of people or engages in a specified level 
of commercial activity, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (defining an "employer" for the 
purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
107. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Act also regulated numerous 
other matters that arguably fall outside the narrow strictures Justice Thomas proposes, in­
cluding such matters as the requirement that ships bound overseas carry "a chest of 
medicines, put up by some apothecary of known reputation, and accompanied by directions 
for administering the same," § 8, 1 Stat. at 134, and that there be, "well secured under deck, 
at least sixty gallons of water, one hundred pounds of salted flesh meat, and one hundred 
pounds of wholesome ship-bread" for each person aboard, § 9, 1 Stat. at 135. 
108. § 2, 1 Stat. at 132. 
109. See § 3, 1 Stat. at 132-33. The majority in Printz rejected the argument that this 
provision reflected an assumption by the First Congress that it was free to "commandeer" the 
states. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2371 n.2 (1997). The Court found the 
provision unremarkable, believing the functions it imposed on state judges were not "execu-
May 1999] Bill of Rights 1651 
This is, I submit, an example of the process of "liquidating and 
ascertaining" the meaning of the original text, which Madison de­
scribed in Federalist No. 37 and which the Framers and Founders 
found both necessary and proper. It is also, in many important re­
spects, an interpretive enterprise that casts originalism in a some­
what different light, making it a matter of meaning over, rather than 
simply within, time. 
That was, I suspect, the understanding of both the states, as 
states, and the people to whom the task of ratification fell. Con­
sider, for example, the text and implications of the formal letter 
transmitting the Constitution to the Confederation Congress, which 
stated, "[i]t is obviously impracticable in the foederal government 
of these States; to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to 
each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all - Individu­
als entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve 
the rest."11° The powers of "the general government of the Union" 
were to be "fully and effectually vested" in that entity, consistent 
with "that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true 
American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our 
prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence[.]"111 
This does not mean that the document forwarded to the people for 
their consideration answered every possible question with absolute 
clarity and precision. As I have already noted, those portions of the 
text describing the proposed division of authority were, both of ne-
tive" in nature, as were the tasks at issue in the case before it. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371 
n.2. It is difficult, however, to understand why that distinction matters if the core concern is 
for state sovereignty. It is one thing to provide, in the Constitution itself, that "[t]his 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .  
shall be the supreme Law of the Land[,]" U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2, and to expect state judges 
to enforce federal statutes in cases otherwise within their jurisdiction. It is quite another to 
posit that Congress may co=and state judges to entertain federally created causes of 
action. 
110. Letter from George Washington, President of the Convention, to the President of 
Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 99, at 305. For a detailed and insightful discussion of the letter 
and its significance, see Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An 
Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REv. 615 (1995). 
The Convention unanimously approved the letter and included it with the text of the 
Constitution when it was "transmitted to the several [state] legislatures in order to be submit­
ted to a convention of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof[.]" Resolution of 
the Confederation Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), in 1 THE DoCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 340. One of the interesting side issues 
presented by this is, of course, the strict "legality" of what transpired. For a "dialogue" on 
the issues, compare Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 475 (1995), with Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitu­
tional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994), and Akhil Reed Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043 
(1988). 
111. Letter from George Washington, President of the Convention, to the President of 
Congress, in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 99, at 305. 
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cessity and by design, unclear. Indeed, the letter itself stressed that 
"[i]t is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between 
those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be 
reserved," a task made especially tenuous in this instance "by a dif­
ference among the several States as to their situation, extent, habits, 
and particular interests."112 
' 
A second example of this phenomenon is found in the events 
and circumstances leading to what has aptly been described as the 
Court's "most influential opinion,"113 M'Culloch v. Maryland.114 
Once again, the focus is on the ultimate implications of the Tenth 
Amendment and on the particular views of James Madison, who 
expressed considerable reservations about the power of Congress to 
create the Bank of the United States when that entity was first pro­
posed by Alexander Hamilton. These qualms arose from a matter 
on which he presumed to speak with considerable authority, the 
argument that the government lacked the power to incorporate. 
During the Convention, Franklin had moved to amend the "post 
roads" clause to include "a power to provide for cutting canals 
where deemed necessary."115 Responding, Madison had 
suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power "to grant char­
ters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might require & 
the legislative provisions of individual States may be incompetent." 
His primary object, however, was to secure an easy communication 
between the States, which the free intercourse now to be opened 
seemed to call for - The political obstacles being removed, a removal 
of the natural ones as far as possible ought to follow.116 
Franklin's motion was so modified but ultimately failed, gaining the 
support of only three states, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and (ironically, 
as subsequent events would establish) Virginia. The accounts of 
this debate are sketchy. But, significantly, one factor in the nega­
tive decision was apparently the very issue Hamilton now broached, 
the spectre of "establishment of a Bank."117 
112. Id. 
113. Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 333, 359 tbl.6 (1998). 
114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
115. 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 615 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
(Franklin's motion to amend Article I, § 8, cl. 7). 
116. Id. 
117. See id. at 616, where Rufus King of Massachusetts observed: "The states will be 
prejudiced and divided into parties by it - In Philada. & New York, It will be referred to the 
establishment of a Bank, which has been a subject of contention in those Cities." 
Jefferson's Diary contained a similar observation. See 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 278, 278 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (recounting a conversation between 
Abraham Baldwin and James Wtlson regarding the corporate power, and noting that banks 
in particular had been a politically divisive issue). 
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Madison believed there was no express power to incorporate, 
much less to incorporate a bank.118 Moreover, he could not find 
any clause that supported an inference that Congress had such 
power.119 This left the Necessary and Proper Clause, which 
Madison declared "must, according to the natural and obvious force 
of the terms and the context, be limited to means necessary to the 
end, and incident to the nature of the specified powers. "120 He 
averred that the establishment of a Bank would not be "direct and 
incidental," but instead simply "conducive to the successful con­
ducting of the finances[.]"121 This went too far: "If implications, 
thus remote and thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain 
may be formed that will reach every object of legislation, every ob­
ject within the whole compass of political economy."122 Both the 
terms of the Constitution and the realities attendant to its ratifica­
tion counseled against this course, which implicated the promise 
"that the powers not given were retained" and violated the "funda­
mental principle . . . that the terms necessary and proper gave no 
additional powers to those enumerated."123 
Madison's views did not prevail. The bill creating the First Bank 
was eventually signed by President Washington, and the Bank itself 
endured until its charter expired. Once past the dislocations caused 
by the War of 1812, national attention focused again on the need 
for, and constitutionality of, a federal bank. Madison's role and 
views during this protracted process are especially interesting. As 
President, it was Madison who vetoed the first serious attempt at 
renewal. In his Veto Message, however, he confined his observa­
tions on the issue of constitutionality of a Bank to a single, terse 
passage, in which he 
[w]aiv[ed] the question of the constitutional authority of the Legisla­
ture to establish an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judg­
ment by repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the 
validity of such an institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in 
118. See 2 .ANNALS OF CoNG. 1896 (1791). 
119. See id. at 1896-98. 
120. Id. at 1898. The italicized words are as they appear in the version printed in 
Madison's Papers, which followed the original version printed in the Gazette of the U.S., Feb. 
23, 1791. See 13 MAo1soN's PAPERS, supra note 98, at 372, 376. 
121. 2 .ANNALS OF CoNG. 1898 (1791). 
122. Id. at 1899. 
123. Id. at 1901. Madison spoke again on February 8th, but that statement added little to 
this analysis. See id. at 1956-60. It was the final significant speech in the debate, for when 
Gerry "rose to reply . . .  the House discovering an impatience to have the main question put, 
after a few remarks, he waived any further observations." Id. at 1960. 
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different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the 
nation[.]124 
Madison would eventually concede the apparent inconsistency be­
tween his position in 1791 and the one he embraced as President.125 
His views were, however, more nuanced than his critics alleged. He 
adhered to his original view that, in his estimation, Congress did not 
have the authority to create a Bartle But that was, as a constitu­
tional matter, secondary; there was "an evidence of the Public Judg­
ment, necessarily superseding individual opinions."126 This was not 
a new position, conjured up by an elder statesman looking back on 
his career and attempting to justify his actions. In his May 1821 
letter to Spencer Roane, Madison had observed: 
In resorting to legal precedents as sanctions to power, the distinctions 
should ever be strictly attended to, between such as take place under 
transitory impressions, or without full examination & deliberation, 
and such as pass with solemnities and repetitions sufficient to imply a 
concurrence of the judgment & the will of those, who having granted 
the power, have the ultimate right to explain the grant.127 
There are striking parallels between this position and the one 
taken by Marshall in M'Culloch. Most proponents of an expansive 
reading of the text draw primary support from Marshall's axiom 
that "[i]n considering this question . . .  we must never forget, that it 
is a constitution we are expounding."128 The sentence is clearly crit­
ical to the opinion. It falls at the end of the paragraph in which 
Marshall stressed the refusal of the individuals who framed the 
Tenth Amendment to include the limiting term "expressly," and 
emphasized that the enumerated powers sections of the text simply 
provided a "great outline[ ]" within which "important objects 
124. James Madison, Veto Message (Jan. 30, 1815), in 8 MADISON'S WRITINGS, supra note 
83, at 327, 327. For a discussion of the process and events surrounding the creation of a 
federal bank, see BRAY liAMMoND, BANKS AND PoLmcs IN AMERICA FROM nm REvoLU· 
TION TO nm CIVIL WAR 227-33 (1957). Ha=ond notes that Madison's "objections were 
wholly practical[,]" id. at 232, and that "[t]he question of constitutionality, which had so 
much sincere prominence in 1791 and so much insincere prominence in 1811, had none at all 
in these debates of 1814, 1815, and 1816," id. at 233. 
125. See Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec., 1831), in 9 MADISON'S WRIT· 
INGS, supra note 83, at 471. 
126. Id. at 476-77. It is worth noting that Madison's actual grounds for the veto were a 
gap between the professed intentions and the actual mechanics. See Madison, Veto Message, 
supra note 124, at 330 (su=arizing his objections and indicating that "in return for [the] 
extraordinary concessions" granted, there "should [be] a greater security for attaining the 
public objects of the institution than is presented in the bill"). 
127. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in 9 MAmsoN's WRIT· 
rnos, supra note 83, at 55, 61; see also id. at 62 ("A liberal & steady course of practice can 
alone reconcile the several provisions of the Constitution literally at variance with each 
other[.]"). Madison insisted, however, that this process required broad participation. In the 
sentences immediately following, he stressed his conviction "that Legislative precedents are 
frequently of a character entitled to little respect, and that those of Congress are sometimes 
liable to peculiar distrust." Id. at 61. 
128. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
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[were] designated" while "the minor ingredients which compose 
those objects" remained to "be deduced from the nature of the ob­
jects themselves."129 Marshall would subsequently indicate, how­
ever, that this interpretive gloss must be read with care. 
Speaking as "A Friend of the Constitution," Marshall empha­
sized that the interpretive powers vested in the Court did not give 
that body "a right to change that instrument."130 That did not sig­
nal, however, any sense that Marshall believed the text had a defi­
nite, fixed meaning at the point of ratification. Echoing Madison's 
precise argument, Marshall had stressed at the outset of his opinion 
that whether 
Congress [has the] power to incorporate a bank . . .  can scarcely be 
considered as an open question, entirely unprejudiced by the former 
proceedings of the nation respecting it. The principle now contested 
was introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recog­
nized by many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the 
judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of un­
doubted obligation.131 
In clear reference to the debates between Madison, Jefferson, 
Randolph, and Hamilton, Marshall stressed that the measure creat­
ing the First Bank was "resisted, first in the fair and open field of 
debate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet, with as much per­
severing talent as any measure has ever experienced, and being sup­
ported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and as 
intelligent as this country can boast, it became a law."132 
This reading of M'Culloch does not do violence to the great les­
son of Marbury, that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is."133 Rather, it sug­
gests that both Marshall and Madison understood the role that each 
branch, and the people, play in the dynamic process of ascribing 
meaning to a necessarily imprecise document. In particular, it sup­
ports Madison's considered judgment that a course of interpreta­
tion and conduct, acceded to over time by individuals in a unique 
position to determine what the text should mean, is entitled to re­
spect. Accordingly, the language and holding of M'Culloch seem to 
be precisely, and unmistakably, an exercise in "liquidating and as­
certaining" a reading of the Constitution within which an initial tex­
tual grant gained substantive meaning only over time - a meaning 
"pass[ ed] with solemnities and repetitions sufficient to imply a con-
129. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401. 
130. John Marshall, 8 A Friend of the Constitution, A.!.ExANDRIA GAZETrE, July 14, 1819, 
reprinted in JOHN MARsHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND, supra note 57, at 
200, 209. 
131. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401. 
132. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 404. 
133. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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currence of the judgment & the will of those, who having granted 
the power, have the ultimate right to explain the grant."134 
The reservations I express about the originalist enterprise are, 
obviously, limited (at least for the purposes of this review). Assum­
ing for the sake of argument that there is something to be said for 
ascertaining the original meaning of the words, and the general in­
tentions of those who wrote and spoke them, is it appropriate to 
rely only on what was said and done during the actual drafting of, 
debate about, and ratification of the Bill of Rights? Is it proper for 
the Court in particular to treat the meaning of these constitutional 
provisions as something that may properly be illuminated only by 
artifacts dating from that narrow period? That is clearly the posi­
tion Dean Cogan would have us accept, and one to which a substan­
tial proportion of the devotees of originalism are committed. But it 
does not appear to be the approach that the principal Framers 
would have taken, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that it 
is proper to include, for example, Marshall and Madison within the 
ranks of originalists. Madison "entirely concur[ red] in the propriety 
of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and 
ratified by the nation[,]" understanding that "[i]n that sense alone it 
is the legitimate Constitution."135 But he also recognized that "[i]f 
the meaning of the text be sought in the changeable meaning of the 
words composing it, it is evident that the shape and attributes of the 
Government must partake of the changes to which the words and 
phrases of all living languages are constantly subject."136 
The approach Dean Cogan embraces is inconsistent with that 
understanding. And it is clearly less than satisfactory in one area of 
consummate interest and importance for the contemporary 
originalist: the question of just what it is Congress had in mind 
when it sent to the several states an amendment proposing that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli­
gion" (p. 11), much less what Madison meant when he initially pro­
posed that "nor shall any national religion be established."137 
Which brings us back to Judge Hand, and, in particular, the meta­
phor that has dominated the Court's discussion of the 
134. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in 9 MADISON'S WRIT· 
INGS, supra note 83, at 55, 61. 
135. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 MADISON'S WRIT· 
INGS, supra note 83, at 190, 191 (emphases added). 
136. Id. 
137. P. 1. It is, I believe, worth noting that Dr. Johnson illustrated at least two of his 
definitions of the word "establish" with quotations speaking expressly of the "establishment" 
of religion. See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo. 
reprint 1967) (1755) ("Soon after the rebellion broke out, the Presbyterian sect was estab­
lished in all its forms by an ordinance of the lords and commons" . . . .  "So were the churches 
established in the faith."). 
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Establishment Clause for the past one hundred and twenty years, 
Jefferson's "wall of separation." 
Ill. JUDGE HAND REVISITED 
As the Court voyages through the stormy seas created by mod­
em efforts to, for example, "put Christ back in Christmas,"138 the 
issues posed by attempts to enforce an Establishment Clause pro­
posed and ratified in the almost uniformly Christian world of the 
late eighteenth century in the diverse and cacophonous 1990s are 
extraordinarily complex. Not surprisingly, the Court's various solu­
tions to the problems are often confused and confusing at best. De­
pending on what is at stake, for example, the analytic matrix is as 
varied as the three part inquiry articulated in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 139 the historical test advanced in Marsh v. Chambers, 140 
the "plastic reindeer" option outlined in Lynch v. Donnelly, 141 the 
coercion approach set forth in Lee v. Weisman, 142 and the different 
forms of an endorsement inquiry found in various opinions by 
Justice O'Connor143 and, arguably, in Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Board v. Pinette.144 
In each instance, there is at least one common denominator: the 
realization that much of our understanding of the Establishment 
Clause has been shaped by Jefferson's "wall of separation." The 
origins of the metaphor are familiar. When asked by a Committee 
138. It is one of the enduring ironies of modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence that 
those seeking to achieve this goal are allowed by the Court to do so only to the extent that 
their displays include, "among other things, a Santa Claus house [and] reindeer pulling 
Santa's sleigh[.]" Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). Christmas, it seems, is not a 
Christian holy day. It is, rather, a "traditional event Jong recognized as a National Holiday." 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (citation omitted). And it remained for Justice Brennan, in dissent, to 
remind the Brethren that "[t]he nativity scene is . . .  the chief symbol of the characteristically 
Christian belief that a divine Savior was brought into the world and that the purpose of this 
miraculous birth was to illuminate a path toward salvation and redemption. For Christians, 
that path is exclusive, precious, and holy." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
139. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). As matters stand today, reports of the death of Lemon have 
been greatly exaggerated, much to the chagrin of certain members of the Court. In Lamb's 
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), the Court invoked 
Lemon as part of its analysis, 508 U.S. at 395, prompting Justice Scalia to lament: 
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and 
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school 
attorneys of the Center Moriches Union Free School District. 
508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
140. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
141. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
142. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
143. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 627-
32 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(characterizing the central concern as whether the display "endorsed Christianity"). 
144. 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995) (plurality opinion); 515 U.S. at 790 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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of the Danbury Baptist Association for his understanding of these 
matters, Jefferson responded with his famous letter of January 1, 
1802.145 And he expressed the views that have shaped much of our 
modem understanding of the Establishment Clause when he 
declared: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between 
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or 
his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions 
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence the 
act of the whole American people which declared that their legisla­
ture should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separa­
tion between Church and State.146 
Dean Cogan does not include Jefferson's celebrated letter as 
one of the supplemental texts. This reflects, presumably, his belief 
that a letter sent twelve years after ratification cannot, or at least 
should not, be deemed significant in a truly originalist explica­
tion.147 That assumption, as I argued in the previous section of this 
review, is curious for at least two reasons. As a matter of tech­
nique, it embraces a very narrow understanding of what originalism 
entails, imposing the date on which a sufficient number of states 
had ratified as the outer limit on materials of importance. More 
troubling, at least in my estimation, is the belief that this approach 
is consistent with the views and intentions of a group of individuals 
who understood the imprecise and tenuous nature of the document 
they had crafted and who stressed the need to "liquidate and ascer­
tain" its meaning over time. 
It is also possible that Dean Cogan believes the letter and the 
metaphor it embraces might be troubling in their own right. If so, 
he is not alone in this. The Court itself has indicated that the "wall" 
is often rather a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier, depend­
ing on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."148 It is, as 
Justice Jackson once observed, "as winding as the famous serpen­
tine wall" Jefferson designed for the University of Virginia.149 At 
best, it is a "useful figure of speech."150 Indeed, various members of 
the Court have railed against the very idea of a wall, maintaining 
145. Danbury Baptist Letter, supra note 28, at 281. 
146. Id. at 281-82. 
147. One may usefully contrast this decision with the one made by the editors of The 
Founders' Constitution, who include an excerpt from the letter in their work. See 5 THE 
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 96. 
148. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 {1971). 
149. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 {1948) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
150. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 {1984). 
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that, for example, "[a] rule of law should not be drawn from a fig­
ure of speech."151 
That view, of course, has not been embraced by the Court as a 
whole. Rather, Jefferson's wall has become a central tenet in the 
protracted debate. Indeed, the Court has attributed it not simply to 
Jefferson, but to the entire Founding generation for whom he pre­
sumably spoke. In the first decision in which the Court used the 
wall metaphor, Chief Justice Waite tied the invocation of the letter 
to Jefferson's status as a central figure in the Framing process, ob­
serving, "[c]oming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the 
advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authori­
tative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus 
secured."152 That characterization is, obviously, at odds with the 
one that would be ascribed to the letter if the approach adopted by 
Dean Cogan is embraced. A work that defines "a reasonably com­
plete set of relevant texts" as one that stops at "the point of ratifica­
tion" (p. lviii; emphasis added) can hardly include a letter written 
almost twelve years later, much less treat such a document as "au­
thoritative" given the assumptions on which it proceeds. Nor, for 
that matter, can it properly be concerned with the nature and impli­
cations of a decision reached at a point in time even more removed 
from the one it seeks to illuminate, such as the drafting and ratifica­
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided the means by 
which limitations imposed on the power of Congress to "establish" 
religion were made applicable against the states themselves. 
Strictly speaking, the assumptions that animated Jefferson, 
Madison, and the other Framers and Founders as they debated the 
need for, and eventually proposed and ratified, a Bill of Rights have 
little bearing on the question that provoked Judge Hand - whether 
or not the State of Alabama could pass measures that posed a spec­
tre of establishment in a world where the First Amendment in fact 
limited the authority of the states. In this regard, much can be said 
for the position Justice Scalia expressed in Mcintyre, which argua­
bly eschews probing the minds and practices of the Founding gener­
ation in favor of an inquiry into what was intended by the 
individuals who crafted the Fourteenth Amendment itself.153 The 
originalist enterprise assumes by its very nature, however, that the 
thoughts and deeds of individuals like .Jefferson and Madison mat­
ter a very great deal in the process of giving meaning to the Bill of 
Rights. There is, accordingly, considerable justification for relying 
on the letter and its description of a wall of separation as an appro­
priate point for judicial interpretation - assuming, as I do, that the 
151. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 247 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
152. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77. 
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Framers and Founders themselves intended that original meanings 
and intentions be leavened with the wisdom gained by experience. 
One need not, of course, rely on postratification events and doc­
uments to understand the nature and scope of the concerns posed 
by either a formal relationship between church and state, or by any 
intimation that the coercive powers of a state might be brought to 
bear either to shape individual religious beliefs or to restrict reli­
gious practices. As Dean Cogan himself correctly perceives, one 
may glean considerable insight from preratificati6n texts, including, 
for example, Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli­
gious Assessments, 1786 (pp. 46-51) and Virginia's Bill for Religious 
Freedom, 1786 (pp. 51-52), which has appropriately been character­
ized as an enactment of principles Jefferson championed under the 
leadership of Madison.154 And there is much that might be learned 
from many other pre-ratification texts, some of which Dean Cogan 
does not include. Jefferson, for example, proposed in 1776 that the 
Virginia Constitution declare expressly that "nor shall any [person] 
be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious institution,"155 a 
prohibition that tracks closely the spirit that animates his eventual 
expression of the need for a "wall of separation." And in his Bill 
for Religious Freedom, 1786 (pp. 51-52), he condemned as "sinful 
and tyrannical" the assumption that any government could "compel 
a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of 
opinions which he disbelieves[.]"156 
These sentiments are consistent with an understanding of both 
the need for and implications of a wall of separation that would 
condemn even the intimation that government could direct the 
manner in which individual citizens professed, or failed to profess, 
their religions - much less the assumption that government could 
embrace one particular sect as its established church or insinuate 
the prayers and practices of that sect into public life. And they are 
consistent with the postratification experiences of individuals whose 
own official encounters with demands that government recognize 
particular religions in a variety of ways amply demonstrated the 
154. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 162 
{1994). 
155. Thomas Jefferson, Third Draft [of the Virginia Constitution] by Jefferson, in 1 THE 
PAPERS oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 356, 363 {Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). As Mayer notes, the 
draft arrived too late for consideration, see MA YER, supra note 154, at 158, and the Conven­
tion adopted a formulation proposed by Madison, which spoke simply of the "free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience" P. 44. 
156. Cogan includes the Bill but does not, consistent with his general editorial principles, 
document Jefferson's role. The sentiments expressed in the Bill itself, of course, echo both 
Jefferson's wall and the Court's understanding that the prohibition on "establishment" means 
that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities," 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 {1947) (emphasis added) - a declaration I take to 
include within its ambit state support for the sort of prayers at issue in Ja!free, "whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt[.]" 330 U.S. at 16. 
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need for fashioning a wall. During the campaign that propelled him 
into the Presidency, for example, Jefferson was assailed by 
Federalist clergy from New England who believed he would not in 
fact "establish[ ]  a particular form of Christianity through the 
United States. "157 In language that tracks closely the message he 
would send two years later, Jefferson confirmed their fears: "they 
believe that any portion of power confided to me, will be exerted in 
opposition to their schemes. And they believe rightly: for I have 
sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form of 
tyranny over the mind of man. "158 
Hostility to every form of such enactments, of course, expresses 
an opposition to impositions by both federal and state tyrants, a 
position consistent with both his understanding of the demands im­
posed by the by-then ratified First Amendment and, I assume, with 
how he would view the strictures of an Amendment incorporated 
against the states. That was, obviously, a development Jefferson 
could not have anticipated, and likely would have opposed vigor­
ously on other grounds. But it is also one that, if in place, he would 
presumably have enforced, particularly when the proscription ech­
oes the precise state of affairs he successfully pursued in Virginia. 
In a similar vein, a President Madison, troubled by the negative re­
action to a proclamation that counseled prayer only by those "so 
c;lisposed,"159 in a subsequent proclamation both repeated that qual­
ifier160 and stressed that the only "public homage . . . worthy the 
favorable regard of the Holy and Omniscient Being to whom it is 
addressed" must be the product of the "free choice" of a people 
"freed from all coercive edicts."161 And on leaving office, Madison 
would speak with considerable approval of the changes wrought in 
Virginia in the wake of the Commonwealth's decision to "abolish[ ] 
the Religious establishment, and put[ ] all Sects at full liberty and 
on a perfect level. "162 
· 
157. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800), in 10 
JEFFERSON'S WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 173, 175. 
158. Id. (emphasis added). 
159. Proclamation (July 9, 1812), reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MEssAGES AND 
p APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 513, 513. 
160. See Proclamation (July 23, 1813), reprinted in id. at 532, 532 (recommending prayer 
to "all who shall be piously disposed"). 
161. Id. at 533. I discuss the implications of Madison's willingness to even issue such 
Proclamations at infra text accompanying notes 187-192. 
162. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Mar. 2, 1819), in 8 MAD1soN's WRIT­
INGS, supra note 83, at 425, 430. The letter tracks closely sentiments Madison expressed 
forty-five years earlier, when he compared the favorable climate found in the "Northern 
Colonies" (such as Pennsylvania) with the less propitious situation that prevailed in Vrrginia, 
where "the Church of England [was] the established and general Religion[.]" Letter from 
James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in 1 MAD1soN's PAPERS, supra note 98, 
at 104, 105. 
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There is, accordingly, considerable justification for relying on 
the letter and its description of a wall of separation as a proper 
starting point for judicial interpretation, assuming, as I do, that the 
Framers and Founders themselves were both concerned with origi­
nal intentions and understood that these were to be leavened with 
the wisdom gained by experience. Obviously, the Framers and 
Founders did not understand the First Amendment to limit state 
actions, and many of them shared a particularly robust set of beliefs 
about the sovereignty of the individual states. Indeed, M'Culloch in 
particular would prove an especially galling development for a sub­
stantial number of individuals, including Jefferson.163 The question 
is not, however, how they might have felt about the suggestion that 
the Establishment Clause might limit state actions in a world with­
out the express limitations on state authority provided by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is, rather, how 
their notions of the natural rights of man, informed by a particular 
understanding of the evils of establishment, might best be under­
stood in a contemporary world where incorporation in fact limits 
state authority in fundamental respects. 
This is a difficult question for any number of reasons, not the 
least of which is that, viewed in isolation, the events and expecta­
tions of the period immediately after ratification offer considerable 
comfort to those who believe the authors of the First Amendment 
contemplated leaving these matters to the individual states - and 
that, by doing so, they expressly countenanced any number of prac­
tices that the modern Court condemns. 
Six of the ratifying states supported either a single church or had 
constitutional or statutory provisions that authorized multiple es­
tablishments.164 Four others, while arguably not "establishing" in 
the traditional sense, nevertheless barred anyone who was not a 
Protestant, or at least a Christian, from holding public office.16s 
Many of these arrangements were ended during and immediately 
after ratification, with the last state to do so, Massachusetts, ratify­
ing, by popular vote and a ten-to-one margin, an amendment to its 
Constitution in 1833 that ended its relationship with the 
163. For a general discussion of the controversy the decision provoked, see JOHN 
MARsHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND, supra note 57, at 3-21. 
164. Tue six were Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, within which the 
Congregationalists were recognized by local rules permitted by the state structure, and 
Georgia, Maryland, and South Carolina, which embraced a more general form of establish­
ment. For a detailed discussion of the authorizations and arrangements, see LEONARD W. 
LEVY, THE EsTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25-62 {1986). 
165. Tue four were Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. In Rhode 
Island, in tum, Catholics and Jews were apparently not even allowed to become citizens, 
much less members of the governing class. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RE­
LATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 29 {1987). 
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Congregational Church.166 Of course, it was one thing to eliminate 
the provision that authorized each of the "several towns, parishes, 
precincts, and other bodies politic, or religious societies, to make 
suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the 
public worship of Goo,"167 and quite another to sever the church­
state relationship entirely. Preferences for Christianity, or at least 
for a profession of belief in a single God, persisted well into the 
twentieth century. In Massachusetts, for example, the same amend­
ment that terminated the local support option nevertheless re­
minded one and all that "the public worship of Goo and 
instructions in piety, religion, and morality, promote the happiness 
and prosperity of a people, and the security of a republican govem­
ment[.]"168 Nor was there inclination to criticize when, for exam­
ple, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, confronted in 1908 by a 
challenge to a Sunday closing law by someone who did not view the 
solemnities of that day in the same manner as the Christian major­
ity, reminded those who might be troubled by such practices that 
while 
[w]e doubt very much whether there were any disciples of Mahomet 
in Nebraska in 1873, . . . those who have emigrated to Nebraska since 
that day come here with full knowledge of the Sunday statute, and 
their appearance in our commonwealth will hardly render unconstitu­
tional and void an act of the Legislature that theretofore was valid.169 
In both words and deeds, then, the United States remained a 
Christian nation long after ratification, and there is little evidence 
that the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment had a material ef­
fect on this reality. The provision in the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights mandating "no religious test . . .  other than a declaration of 
belief in the existence of God,"11o for example, remained in force 
until stricken by the Court in 1961.171 The inhabitants of Utah, in 
tum, while deprived of their ability to practice polygamy by 
Reynolds, entered the Union with a Constitution whose Preamble 
expressed their gratitude "to Almighty God for life and liberty."172 
And the people of Texas, having abjured "the heresies of nullifica­
tion and secession" in an 1868 instrument that contained broad pro-
166. See LEVY, supra note 164, at 37-38. 
167. MAss. CoNST. Declaration of Rights, art. III, in 3 Thorpe, supra note 24, at 1889, 
1890. 
168. MAss. CONST. amend. XI, in 3 Thorpe, supra note 24 at 1914. 
169. Ex parte caldwell, 118 N.W. 133, 135 (Neb. 1908). As is the case with creches and 
Christmas, the Court's modem protection of Sunday turns on notions that what was once a 
holy day for a substantial portion of the population has transformed itself, becoming instead 
a secular "day of rest." See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
170. MD. CONST. art. 37, quoted in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961). 
171. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 496. 
172. UTAH CoNsT. 1895, Preamble, in 6 Thorpe, supra note 24, at 3700, 3702. 
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tection of religious liberty and strict separation,173 quickly clarified 
how limited their actual vision of religious liberty was in 1876 when 
they proclaimed that 
No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office, 
or public trust, in this State; nor shall any one be excluded from hold­
ing office on account of his religious sentiments, provided he ac­
knowledge the existence of a Supreme Being.174 
Does all of this, as Judge Hand maintained, mean that a state is 
in fact free to establish religion, perhaps even, as nine of the states 
did in 1776,175 to embrace a particular sect as the preferred expres­
sion of its citizens' beliefs? These are, after all, the sort of historical 
artifacts that give considerable aid and comfort to those who argue 
that the Establishment Clause does not stand as a barrier to these 
particular sorts of practices. My own inclination is to answer, re­
soundingly, "no."176 And I believe this is how Madison, Jefferson, 
and the ·others of their generation who considered such matters 
would respond when confronted by the demands made today in the 
name of their supposed beliefs. But in doing so I draw on materials 
outside the ambit of The Complete Bill of Rights, framing my re­
sponse within both the letter and spirit of Jefferson's wall and my 
attempt, to use one of Dean Cogan's formulations of the originalist 
enterprise (p. lvi), to determine the "principle" for which the 
Establishment Clause stood in the minds of the principal players, 
even if that principle might occasionally seem at odds with, for ex­
ample, their "understanding" as expressed through their occasional 
actions and those of the states and nation within which they lived. 
The lines of demarcation undergirding this particular assump­
tion are hardly clear. Justice Story, for example, maintained in his 
Commentaries that 
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the 
amendment to it, now under consideration, the general, if not the uni­
versal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive 
encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with the 
private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship.177 
This position, he believed, was entirely reasonable: 
[E]very American colony, from its foundation down to the revolution, 
with the exception of Rhode Island, (if, indeed, that state be an ex­
ception), did openly, by the whole course of its laws and institutions, 
173. See TEXAS CoNST. 1868, Preamble & art. 1, § 4, in 6 Thorpe, supra note 24, at 3591-
3592. 
174. TEXAS CoNST. 1876, art. I, § 4, in 6 Thorpe, supra note 24, at 3621, 3621. 
175. See Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1114 (S.D. Ala. 1983) ("At 
the beginning of the Revolution established churches existed in nine of the colonies."). 
176. For a brief take on the nuances of my position, see infra text accompanying notes 
194-197. 
177. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1868 (1833). The amendment "now under consideration" was, of course, the Fust. 
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support and sustain, in some form, the Christian religion; and almost 
invariably gave a peculiar sanction to some of its fundamental 
doctrines.178 
Justice Story thus distinguished the "duty of supporting religion" 
from the "right to force the consciences of other men,"179 and lim­
ited the scope of the First Amendment to an attempt to "exclude all 
rivalry among Christian sects" and to "prevent any national ecclesi­
astical establishment. "180 
Indeed, as advocates of various forms of establishment remind 
us, Jefferson himself at many junctures engaged in conduct arguably 
at odds with the wall metaphor. For example, he sent to Congress a 
treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians which would require the appro­
priation of federal funds to both support a Catholic priest to minis­
ter to the tribe and build a church for those purposes.181 And he 
seemed to contemplate that religion, and matters religious, would 
play a substantial role in the lives of the faculty and students at one 
of his most treasured creations, the University of Virginia.182 
Jefferson would, nevertheless, insist that Christianity itself was 
not a part of the common law, a position that particularly rankled 
Justice Story.183 And while he was willing to make religious prac­
tices and studies a centerpiece at his University, it would, I believe, 
be a mistake to ascribe to him a collateral belief either that it was 
proper to invoke the coercive power of the state to require a partic­
ular religious practice, or that state support for religion was proper. 
As he explained six years after the Danbury Baptist episode, "the 
dictates of his own reason" told him "that civil powers alone have 
been given to the President of the United States, and no authority 
to direct the religious exercises of his constituents."184 And while 
178. Id. § 1867. 
179. Id. § 1870. 
180. Id. § 1871 (emphasis added). 
181. The episode is discussed in detail in ROBERT L. CoRD, SEPARATION OF CHuRCH 
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND ClnuIBNT FICTION 38-39 (1982). 
182. Professor Mayer, for example, documents Jefferson's opposition to the inclusion of 
religion in public education in Virginia in general and the University of Virginia in particular, 
and his reluctant concession to a limited religious presence at the latter. See MAYER, supra 
note 154, at 165-66. I assume a similar opposition would follow from the understanding, in a 
post-incorporation world, that the Establishment Clause now provided the same sort of re­
striction on state action it previously imposed on federal. 
183. Compare Thomas Jefferson, Whether Christianity is a Part of the Common Law, in 
REPORTS OF TiiE CASES DETERMINED IN TiiE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA FROM 1730 TO 
1740 AND FROM 1768 To 1772, at 137, 142 (Thomas Jefferson rep., 1829) (characterizing the 
history as demonstrating "not at all, whether Christianity was part of the law of England, but 
simply how far the ecclesiastical law was to be respected by the common law courts"), with 
Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, 9 AM. JURIST & LAW. MAG. 346, 348 
(1833) ("[C]an any man seriously doubt, that Christianity is recognised as true, as a revela­
tion, by the law of England, that is, by the common law?"). 
184. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to The Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 11 
JEFFERSON'S WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 428, 429-30. 
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much of that letter would, as did the earlier one, touch directly on 
the proper role of the federal government in such matters, 185 his 
cautionary notes on the problems posed by government interven­
tion and, quite possibly, support were not so delimited, for he did 
"not believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the civil magis­
trate to direct its exercises, its discipline, or its doctrines[.]"186 
Madison seems to have shared similar views. Obviously, his 
1786 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (p. 
46) is a major indication of his core beliefs, a powerful indictment 
against "experiment[s] on our liberties" (p. 47). As Madison 
observed: 
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christi­
anity, in exclusion of all other religions, may establish, with the same 
ease, any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other sects? 
That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three­
pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, 
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases 
whatsoever. [p. 47] 
There is, nevertheless, considerable room for interpretation here. 
If, as Madison maintained, the evil is exclusivity, does that mean 
that general recognition of religion is barred? If the problem is 
three-pence for a single church, does a measure that allocates its 
contributions to all churches cure the problem? And if he believed 
completely what he said in 1786, how can we explain many of his 
later actions? Can we, for example, read an inclination toward es­
tablishment into Madison's willingness to issue a Proclamation 
making the third Thursday of August 1812 a "day of public humilia­
tion and prayer . . .  for the devout purpose of rendering the Sover­
eign of the Universe and the Benefactor of Mankind the public 
homage due His holy attributes"?187 
The answer, I suspect, is no - and is properly understood as 
such when one considers what Madison had to say about these mat­
ters in the years after ratification. In 1832 the Reverend Adams 
sent Madison a copy of a "Convention sermon on the relation of 
[Christianity] to Civil Govt with a manuscript request of [his] opin­
ion on the subject."188 Madison acknowledged the various ap­
proaches to establishment that had prevailed abroad, and observed 
that "[i]t remained for Nqrth America to bring the great & interest-
185. Compare id. at 428 (discussing the powers "delegated to the General Government"), 
with Danbury Baptist Letter, supra note 28, at 281 ("Contemplat[ing] . . .  that act of the 
whole American people."). 
186. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to The Rev. Samuel Miller, supra note 184, at 429. 
187. James Madison, Proclamation (July 9, 1812), reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MessAGES AND p APERS OF THE I'REsIDENTS, supra note 83, at 513, 513. 
188. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), in 9 MAD1soN's WRITINGS, supra 
note 83, at 484, 484. · 
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ing subject to a fair, and finally to a decisive test."189 Some of the 
New England states still had not, he admitted, "discontinued estab­
lishments of Religions formed under very peculiar circumstances; 
but they have by successive relaxations advanced towards the pre­
vailing example."190 That approach was exemplified by Virginia, 
where "the legal support of Religion was withdrawn[,]" proving suf­
ficiently "that it does not need the support of Govt. and it will 
scarcely be contended that Government has suffered by the exemp­
tion of Religion from its cognizance, or its pecuniary aid."191 
The "fair and decisive" test Madison envisioned was then "an 
entire abstinence of the Govt. from interference in any way 
whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order, & pro­
tecting each sect agst. trespasses on its legal rights by others."192 
This is, if not exactly Jefferson's wall, most certainly an approach 
partaking of its spirit. The initial creation of that wall may well 
have had political overtones and, while I doubt it, might even have 
partaken in its language of some elements of "an impish desire to 
heave a brick at the Congregationalist-Federalist hierarchy of 
Connecticut, whose leading members had denounced him two years 
before as an 'infidel' and 'atheist.' "193 But the wall metaphor itself 
expressed an abiding principle, a spirit of formal separation that 
informed Jefferson's general understanding of the nature of reli­
gious liberty, even as Jefferson the human being occasionally 
strayed from the path of strict separation. 
This does not mean I am comfortable as a substantive matter 
with simply imposing an impenetrable wall that severs all possible 
relationships between Church and State. I have no problem, for 
example, allowing religious actors - be they parents and children, 
or even the religious institutions themselves - access to services 
and benefits routinely provided to all citizens and socially beneficial 
institutions. I draw the line, however, when the question is whether 
overtly religious practices should take place in or on public prop­
erty. On that basis, I am comfortable with the implications of the 
Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York to allow 
religious institutions access to tax exemptions - not because the 
practice is "deeply imbedded in the fabric of our national life,"194 
but rather because a general exemption available to all "beneficial 
and stabilizing influences in community life"195 strikes me as an ap-
189. Id. at 485. 
190. Id. at 486. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 487. 
193. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PRoss., Wmter 1949, at 3, 14. 
194. 397 U.S. 664, 676 {1970). 
195. Walz, 397 U.S. at 673. 
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propriate action in the public interest.196 And I am opposed to 
prayer in public facilities and at public functions, countenanced by 
the Court in Marsh v. Chambers197 - not because the historical 
pedigree for public prayer is somehow greater than that associated 
with tax exemptions, but because I find in such prayers precisely the 
sort of "sinful and tyrannical" act Jefferson and Madison believed 
entirely inappropriate in a government-sanctioned or -supported 
activity. 
A full defense of these �d related judgments is far beyond the 
proper scope of this review. I do believe, however, that there is 
much to be said for an interpretive regime within which the body of 
evidence appropriate to an understanding of establishment is more 
sweeping than that proposed by Dean Cogan. And that Jefferson's 
embrace of the wall metaphor, in a document that does not appear 
in a compendium that seeks to provide a "complete" set of inter­
pretive texts, illustrates nicely the problems I perceive with this vol­
ume and the interpretive regime it advances. 
The recent discovery that Jefferson edited the opginal draft of 
the Danbury Baptist letter in response to political concerns ex­
pressed by those with whom he shared the text has given renewed 
hope to opponents of the wall who believe they now have "proof 
that Jefferson's 'wall' metaphor should never have been interpreted 
as an overarching principle."198 The metaphor itself, however, was 
expressed as a central attribute of a fair and just polity long before 
Jefferson propelled it into the national conscience in his letter.199 
And it remains a useful means for capturing the spirit of a constitu­
tional amendment whose meaning, like so many of the other provi­
sions of that document, was grounded in the words and intentions 
of those who framed and ratified it, but whose ultimate import was 
nevertheless to be "liquidated and ascertained" over time, in the 
light of experience. Madison and Jefferson were not alone in ex-
196. The Court did not embrace this precise approach. It noted that in New York, 
"[e]xemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws," 397 U.S. at 666 (quoting 
N.Y. CoNST. art. 16, § 1), and acknowledged that the state considered the extent to which 
institutions or organizations are "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life" as 
part of the process of exempting entities whose activities are "useful, desirable, and in the 
public interest," 397 U.S. at 673. The Court expressed concern about the extent to which 
such a rule "could conceivably give rise to confrontations that could escalate to constitutional 
dimensions." 397 U.S. at 674. That fear is real. I am simply supporting a principle of nondis· 
crimination, and agreeing that it makes eminent sense to recognize that the sort of evils the 
Establishment Clause contemplates are not posed when a truly neutral tax benefit is made 
available to actors who happen to be religious. 
197. 463 U.S. 783 {1983). 
198. Laurie Goodstein, Fresh Debate on 1802 Jefferson Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998, 
at A20. 
199. See Roger Williams, A Letter to Mr. John Cotton {1644), quoted in LEVY, supra note 
164, at 184 {speaking of a "wall of separation between the garden of the church and the 
wilderness of the world"). 
May 1999] Bill of Rights 1669 
pressing their reservatio ns abo ut the pro pensity of their co untry­
men to embrace practices at o dds with the spirit of the 
Co nstitutio n.200 So me of their i ndividual political practices may, 
admittedly, have appeared inco nsistent with that bel ief. B ut their 
understanding of the First Amendment was indeed that i t  was 
designed to i nterpo se a wall, and that matters rel igio us were, in a 
perfect wo rld, "wisely exempted fro m civil jurisdictio n."201 This is, 
I believe, a lesso n inherent in the carefu l  co nsideratio n  of ho w the 
individuals who created the Bill of Ri ghts felt abo ut the manner in 
which the peo ple wo uld give its guarantees life as the natio n itself 
grew and changed. And i t  is, in particular, a lesso n o n  the nature 
and meaning of establ ishment that may o nly be learned by tho se 
willin g to cast thei r gaze beyo nd the events and actions described 
by Dean Co gan i n  The Complete Bill of Rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Jo hnso n  offers us two defini tio ns of the term "co mplete." 
The first, "Perfect; full; witho ut any defects,"20 2 arguably offers a 
standard that few wo uld aspir e  to . Indeed, Dean Co gan eschews 
such an enterprise, ackno wledging that he has made cho ices and 
that whi le labeled "co mplete," this vo lume is, realisti cally, any thing 
but. The seco nd of Dr. Jo hnso n' s definitio ns, in turn, offers what I 
ho pe Dean Co gan has in mind when he indicates that "[ p ] erhaps, if 
this boo k pro ves useful, there may be an o ppo rtunity for an ex­
panded editio n" (p. lix). As Dr. Jo hnso n  o bserves, a vo lume is  
"co mplete" o nly when i t  is  "[f] inished; ended; co ncluded,"20 3 a pro­
cess perhaps, rather than a state of being. 
I view The Complete Bill of Rights as a wo rk in pro gress. Thi s  
do es no t mean that this initi al acco mplishment i s  no t extrao rdinary, 
o r  that it do es no t merit the descriptio n  "invaluable," assuming it is 
understoo d and emplo y ed o n  its o wn terms. An individual wo nder­
ing, fo r  example, what vari atio ns o n  a theme were struck by the 
vario us attempts to secure the ri ght "to bear arms" can rel iably co n­
sult The Complete Bill of Rights for a quick and autho ritative co m-
200. In his discussion of the Bill of Rights, for example, St. George Tucker both con­
demns many accepted practices and quotes at length contemporaries who perceived that 
"[c]ivil establishments of formularies of faith and worship, are inconsistent with the rights of 
private judgment." 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES app. at 7 n.G. (photo. reprint 1996) (St. 
George Tucker ed., 1803) (quoting Dr. Price's observations on the American.revolution); see 
also 1 id. app. at 296-97 n.B (indicating that in Vrrginia the state bill of rights makes clear 
how futile are the attempts of "civil magistrate[s to] interpose the authority of human laws 
. • .  to prescribe . . .  belief, or produce . . .  conviction"). These materials are not, obviously, 
cited by Cogan. 
201. James Madison, Frrst Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809), in 1 A COMPILATION OF nm 
MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF TiiE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 466, 467. 
202. 1 JOHNSON, supra note 137. 
203. Id. 
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pilation of the various formulations. Massachusetts, for example, 
sought a provision guaranteeing "[t]hat no person, conscientiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms in any case, shall be compelled person­
ally to serve as a soldier" (p. 181). The people of Pennsylvania, in 
tum, directly addressed the individual right, maintaining that "the 
people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and 
their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing 
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of 
them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury 
from individuals" (p. 182). And New York, North Carolina, and 
Virginia spoke in terms that echoed the provision that eventually 
emerged, each articulating in close proximity both the "right to 
keep and bear arms" and the need for a "well regulated militia" 
(pp. 183, 184, 184-85). 
In a similar vein, individuals who are perplexed by the notion 
that modem free "speech" doctrine protects matters as diverse as 
nude dancing204 and flag buming205 may find fuel for their analytic 
fires in the realization that four of the seven states requesting 
amendments of the sort that would eventually coalesce into the 
Free Speech Clause spoke of protection for something more than 
speech. Virginia, for example, proposed that "the people have a 
right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their Sen­
timents" (p. 93). The Pennsylvania constitutional predicate, in turn, 
guaranteed that "every citizen may freely speak, write and print on 
any subject" (p. 95). These formulations, arguably, draw distinc­
tions between pure speech and other forms of expression. And if 
pursued appropriately by those of an originalist bent, such formula­
tions might bolster the argument that there is indeed a constitu­
tional distinction between speech and conduct, and that many 
aspects of modem Firs� Amendment doctrine are worthy of 
reexamination. 
Obviously, I am reluctant to accept many of the assumptions 
that animate that approach, much less certain of the interpretations 
it is likely to compel if understood in the manner that many of its 
practitioners espouse. That reticence does not, however, diminish 
my respect for the accomplishment that The Complete Bill of Rights 
represents, by providing me with a compilation that makes it so 
much easier for me to formulate quickly the sort of comparisons I 
have just offered. And it does so for the Bill of Rights, a portion of 
204. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 {1991) ("[N]ude dancing of the 
kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the 
First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.") {opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.). 
205. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 {1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
{1989). 
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the Constitution that is, by any fair measure, of "surpassing impor­
tance" (p. lv) in the lives and affairs of the American people.206 
What I would like to suggest, then, is that those approaching 
Cogan's work take it for what it is, and was presumably intended to 
be: a rather limited collection of original source materials that of­
fers a "complete" vision of the origins and meanings of the Bill of 
Rights only if one is willing to accede to the proposition Cogan em­
braces. And that the defects I have identified in this work - if 
indeed defects they be - highlight flaws in originalism itself, both 
as it has been commonly practiced and in the extent to which it 
disregards the considered sentiments of the Framers and Founders 
about the nature and difficulty of constitutional interpretation. As 
Jack Rakove has observed: 
With its pressing ambition to find determinate meanings at a fixed 
moment, the strict theory of originalism cannot capture everything 
that was dynamic and creative, and thus uncertain and problematic, in 
the constitutional experiments of the Revolutionary era - which is 
why, after all, the debates of this era were so lively and remain so 
engaging. Where we look for precise answers, the framers and ra­
tifiers were still struggling with complex and novel questions whose 
perplexities did not disappear in 1788.207 
The Framers and Founders understood that the document they 
crafted created a startlingly new and fundamentally different polity, 
a nation of and by the people that would govern through the inno­
vative mechanisms of Compound Republic. And they appreciated 
that the words they used, and the concepts they expressed, were to 
be implemented by a form of government the likes of which the 
world had never seen. They were, moreover, pragmatists, who 
viewed both the governing and interpretive processes as exercises 
in trial and error, undertakings in which meanings would be "liqui­
dated and ascertained" and understandings would grow as time 
passed. Marshall's great opinion for the Court in M'Culloch recog­
nized that dynamic, as did so many of the decisions made by a peo­
ple, a Congress, and a Court who took the words of the Framers 
and Founders seriously, but understood nevertheless that they 
marked the beginning, rather than the end, of the interpretive en­
terprise. Dean Neil Cogan does us a great service by reminding us 
of the truth of that proposition, offering as he does a Complete Bill 
206. For an intriguing argument that the individual rights aspects of the Bill of Rights 
were arguably of secondary interest to the Framers and Founders, see AKHIL REED AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). I have my reservations 
about this interpretation, especially in light of my reading of the value attached by the found­
ing generation to rights per se, as opposed simply to structural guarantees. A discussion of 
those qualms is, understandably, beyond the scope of this review. For an initial expression of 
similar reservations, see Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism for Liberals, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
Sept. 28, 1998, at 31. 
207. RAKoVE, supra note 30, at 10 (1996). 
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of Rights that allows us the opportunity to ponder just what might 
make such an enterprise truly complete. 
